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ABSTRACT

The puzzle of why the cycle of poverty persists and upward
socioeconomic mobility is so difficult has long captivatedscholars and the
public alike. Yet with all of the attention that has been paid to poverty, the
crucial role of the law, particularlystate and local law, in perpetuating
poverty is largely ignored. This Article offers a new theory ofpoverty, one
that introduces the concept of legal immobility. Legal immobility considers
the cumulative effects ofstate and local laws as a mechanism through which
poverty is perpetuatedand upward socioeconomic mobility is stunted. The
Article provides an initialdescriptionand normative account of this undertheorized aspect of our laws and argues that in order to fully understand
poverty, a more complete understanding of the relationship between law
andpoverty is needed. After discussingseveral examples of laws that can
contribute to legal immobility (everythingfrom state and local tax laws to
occupationallicensing laws), the Article offers a three-prongtheory to help
understand the distinct pathways through which individual laws that
contribute to legal immobility function: (1) calculated exploitation; (2)
gratuitous management; and (3) routine neglect. This framework provides
a guidefor future work to build on legal immobility theory. By bringing to
light the cumulative effects of local and state laws in perpetuatingpoverty,
the goal is for legal immobility theory to ultimately help lawmakers develop
new structuralapproachesto tacklingpoverty.
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INTRODUCTION

Nearly one-third of Americans are poor or near poor.' For these families,
living wages, affordable housing, adequate food, and other basic needs are
increasingly out of reach. For decades, scholars have worked to identify the
mechanisms that contribute to the cycle of poverty and to the thwarting of
upward socioeconomic class mobility for poor families. 2 Depending on the

.

1.
Matt Bruenig, One-Third ofAmericans Are In OrNear Poverty, DEMOS: POLICYSHOP (Oct.
20, 2014), https://www.demos.org/blog/10/20/14/one-third-americans-are-or-near-poverty [http://perm
a.cc/U3W6-KWTA]. Forty-nine million Americans live below the poverty line, and fifty-three million
Americans live just above the poverty line. Id.
2.
In this Article, when I discuss poverty, I conceptualize poverty not only as a condition of
living with a reduced or no income, but also in a sociological sense, referring to the condition of living
with "low status, minimal political power, distinctive and sometimes fragile social networks, and
culture." Monica C. Bell, Hidden Laws of the Time of Ferguson, I HARV. L. REv. F. 1, 11 (2018).
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6
5
4
era, stagnant wages,3 the education system, incarceration, neighborhoods,
and most recently, eviction,7 have each been identified as a potential holy
grail answer-a key to unlocking poverty's hold. Yet with all of the
attention that has been paid to poverty, the crucial role of the law,
particularly state- and local-level law, in perpetuating, exacerbating, and
creating poverty is largely ignored. In the 1970s a poverty lawyer once said:
"Poverty creates an abrasive interface with society; poor people are always
bumping into sharp legal things."' These sharp legal things, however, have
rarely been systemically studied or theorized about.
Sociologists, economists, and political scientists have long grappled with
the causes and consequences of poverty, yet the law is usually an
afterthought, if it is mentioned at all. Legal scholars, of course, focus on the
law, but they have been strikingly absent from the discourse on poverty. The
central lines of inquiry for those legal scholars who do write about poverty
law typically fall into two distinct camps: (1) Understanding how the law
might be used to aid the poor; 9 or (2) Understanding how one particular

3.

See Elise Gould, Alyssa Davis, & Will Kimball, Broad-Based Wage Growth is a Key Tool

in the Fight Against Poverty, ECON. POL'Y INST. BRIEFING PAPER NO. 399, (May 20, 2015), https://ww

w.epi.org/files/2015/broad-based-wage-growth-is-a-key-tool-in-the-fight-against-poverty.pdf [https://p
erma.cc/YNR8-SPJKI; see also Peter Gottschalk, Inequality, Income Growth, and Mobility: The Basic
Facts, II J. ECON. PERSPS. 21 (1997).
See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, WHY SEGREGATION MATTERS: POVERTY AND
4.
EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY (2005), https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd/content/qt4xr8z4wb/qt
4xr8z4wb.pdf [http://perma.cc/J5TQ-BVBS]; ABIGAIL THERNSTROM & STEPHAN THERNSTROM, No
EXCUSES: CLOSING THE RACIAL GAP IN LEARNING (2004).
See BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 4-6 (2006); DEVAH
5.
PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION 29-32

&

(2007).
See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
6.
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 4-62 (1987) [hereinafter WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED];
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS 3-50 (1996); ROBERT J SAMPSON, GREAT
AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT (2012); Raj Chetty
Nathaniel Hendren, The Impacts of Neighborhoods on Intergenerational Mobility I: Childhood

Exposure Effects, 133 Q. J. ECON. 1107 (2018); Raj Chetty & Nathaniel Hendren, The Impacts of
Neighborhoods on IntergenerationalMobility II: County-Level Estimates, 133 Q.J. ECON. 1163 (2018);
Raj Chetty et al., Where is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of IntergenerationalMobility in
the United States, 129 Q. J. ECON. 1553 (2014).
7.

See MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY 296-99

(2016).
Stephen Wexler, PracticingLaw for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1050 (1970).
8.
See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 203
9.
(2008) (arguing that should the Supreme Court find a fundamental right to education, housing, or
medical care, it will be due to an interpretation and consolidation of the values society has gradually
internalized, rather than to a moral or philosophical epiphany); Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126

YALE L.J. 2 (2016) (describing how to reinvent labor law in order to help solve contemporary
inequalities); Bertrall L. Ross 11 & Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations
and the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323 (2016) (arguing that the Supreme Court should rely on a more
holistic and reliable measure of political power than it currently does in order to determine whether a
class should receive suspect status for review); Henry Rose, The Poor as a Suspect Class Under the
Equal Protection Clause:An Open ConstitutionalQuestion, 34 NOVA L. REV. 408 (2015) (arguing that
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statute, case, or legal procedure may disadvantage the poor.io
This narrow conception of "poverty law," which focuses almost solely
on individual silos of study within federal law, " is an analytical error and
leaves us with a gaping hole in our understanding of poverty.' 2 A much
broader understanding of poverty law is needed, one that considers how the
cumulative effect of laws-particularly state and local laws-may be a
mechanism through which poverty is created, perpetuated, and
exacerbated.' 3 This critical examination means expanding the scope of
poverty law well beyond the traditional areas of inquiry.
While many legal scholars are aware of laws in their own individual
fields of study that may perpetuate poverty, the literature has not developed
a vocabulary for describing how, in a broad sense, the law is a key driver in
thwarting upward socioeconomic mobility.14 Indeed, the literature has not
the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether the poor are a quasi-suspect or suspect class under the
Equal Protection Clause).
10. See, e.g., Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Labor's Wage War, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 373 (2008);
Karen Syma Czapanskiy, Unemployment InsuranceReforms Jbr Moms, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1093
(2004); Anne L. Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn't Make Work Pay, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285
(2010); Erik J. Olson, No Room at the Inn: A Snapshot of an American Emergency Room, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 449 (1994); Michael Heise, The Unintended Legal and Policy Consequences of the No Child Left
Behind Act, 86 NEB. L. REV. 119 (2007); James E. Ryan, Charter Schools and Public Education, 4
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 393 (2008). There is also some legal scholarship that focuses on the history of laws
related to poverty. This scholarship similarly focuses on federal law, individual statutes, and cases
related to a single area of traditional black letter law. See, e.g., THE POVERTY LAW CANON: EXPLORING

THE MAJOR CASES (Marie A. Failinger & Ezra Rosser eds., 2016) (containing chapters written by legal
scholars that explore the history of some of the significant poverty law cases that have come before the
U.S. Supreme Court); Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fallof Unconscionabilityas the "Law of the Poor",
102 GEO. L.J. 1383, 1383-1441 (2014) (describing the history of unconscionability law as a potential
tool to aid poor consumers); Karen Tani, STATES OF DEPENDENCY: WELFARE, RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN

GOVERNANCE, 1935-1972 (2016) (examining legal contests over welfare benefits and administration in
the years 1935-1972 and discussing the implications of this history for modern American governance).
11. There are, of course, exceptions to this focus on federal law, as discussed further in Part 1.
12. It is rare for legal scholars to consider what are categorized as separate bodies of law together.
Indeed, Anne Alstott identifies this phenomenon (and the limitations of this separate-spheres thinking)
in her article, Neoliberalism in U.S. Family Law: Negative Liberty and Laissez-FaireMarkets in the
Minimal State, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25, 41-42 (2014). Her article finds that "[t]aken together,
constitutional law, subconstitutional family law, and the U.S. welfare state enact a distinctly neoliberal
legal regime for the governance of family life." Id. at 41. She notes, however, that "[w]hat is striking is
that these three bodies of law are so seldom analyzed together. . . . I am certainly as guilty as anyone of
this separate-spheres thinking." Id. at 41. While Alstott's point is different from mine, her work shows
that considering bodies of law that are generally considered separate spheres can lead to new theoretical
and practical insights.
13. Legal scholars sometimes focus on specific areas of the law that may perpetuate poverty, but
the focus is entirely on the individual sub-issue in question, rather than a larger examination of the
cumulative effects of laws across a wide array of legal areas. For example, post-Ferguson, several
scholars have discussed criminal justice debt as an impediment to mobility, but the discussion stops
there. See, e.g., PETER EDELMAN, NOT A CRIME TO BE POOR 3-19 (2017); Neil L. Sobol, Chargingthe

Poor: CriminalJustice Debt & Modern-Day Debtor's Prisons, 75 MD. L. REV. 486 (2016); ALEXES
HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR THE POOR (2016).

14. It is important to note that the concept of legal immobility focuses on upward socioeconomic
class mobility, and not on residential mobility. There are several scholars in conversation about how
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conceptualized what I call legal immobility.' 5 Undertaking this type of
inquiry is a tall order, in part because the law often functions to perpetuate
poverty through local processes that are largely hidden and difficult to
uncover. While there are certainly federal laws that perpetuate poverty, on
a day-to-day basis, it is often the subtleties of these state and local laws,
cumulatively and invisibly, that are the driving forces for how the law works
to perpetuate poverty. This invisible localism of law is rarely studied or even
acknowledged.
While it may appear puzzling that legal scholars have not engaged more
with the relationship between local and state laws and poverty, legal
scholars may have shied away from this type of inquiry in part because it is
difficult, from an empirical perspective, to capture how different states and
localities handle the same problem. Indeed, invisible localism makes it
difficult to make generalizations or claims beyond problems in just one state
or just one locality.
The goal of this Article, however, is not empirical in nature, and I am not
attempting to make causal claims. The purpose of this Article is to provide
an initial description and normative account of this undertheorized aspect
of our laws, with a focus on the role of the invisible localism of the law in
contributing to legal immobility. As I explore the often-ignored role of local
and state laws in perpetuating poverty, I hope to convince the reader that in
order to fully understand poverty and mobility, a more complete account of
the relationship between local and state law and poverty is needed. In recent
and why state and local laws may inhibit residential mobility for poor residents. See, e.g., Michelle
Wilde Anderson, Losing the War ofAttrition: Mobility, Chronic Decline, and Infrastructure, 127 YALE

L.J.F. 522 (2017); David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127
YALE L.J. 78 (2017); Naomi Schoenbaum, Stuck or Rooted? The Costs of Mobility and the Value of
Place, 127 YALE L.J.F. 458 (2017). The conversation is certainly relevant to legal immobility, but
residential mobility is not the focus of legal immobility theory.
15. The concept of legal immobility is distinct from the now fairly mainstream argument that "it
is expensive to be poor." The expensive to be poor line of reasoning focuses on how the conditions of
poverty can lead the poor to having to opt for more expensive options in a variety of settings such as
housing, lending, and food. See Barbara Ehrenreich, It Is Expensive to Be Poor, THE ATLANTIC (Jan.
13, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/01/it-is-expensive-to-be-poor/282979/

[https://perma.cc/E4DD-4P9L] ("I was also dismayed to find that in some ways, it is actually more

expensive to be poor than not poor. If you can't afford the first month's rent and security deposit you
need in order to rent an apartment, you may get stuck in an overpriced residential motel. If you don't
have a kitchen or even a refrigerator and microwave, you will find yourself falling back on convenience

store food, which . . . is alarmingly overpriced. If you need a loan, as most poor people eventually do,

you will end up paying an interest rate many times more than what a more affluent borrower would be

charged. To be poor--especially with children to support and care for-is a perpetual high-wire act.");
BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA (2001) (describing
the author's experiment taking various low-wage jobs and explaining in great detail through her
experiences how it can be more expensive to be poor than not poor).

The concept of legal immobility is also unique from the important criminalization of poverty

argument that has recently surfaced. See infra Part I and infra notes 59 & 60 for an explanation of how
the legal immobility concept differs from the criminalization of poverty argument.
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years, some progress toward this end has been made. In 2015, the United
States Department of Justice's report on the Ferguson Police Department
and courts ("the Ferguson Report") brought a national spotlight to the use
of fees, fines, and other monetary penalties as a means for generating
revenue at the state and local level.1 6 In this Article, I argue that the
revelations exposed in the Ferguson Report are just a small piece of a much
larger systemic phenomenon of local and state laws and systems stunting
upward mobility and contributing to the perpetuation of poverty.'" In the
course of the Article, I discuss driving laws and fees (touched upon in the
Ferguson Report), but I also explore state and local tax law, family law,
nuisance law, and employment licensing law, among others. I argue that the
cumulative effects of all of these laws (and others), working together to form
a complex web of barriers, lead to legal immobility.
While I focus on the cumulative effects of all of these laws, I also
articulate a three-prong theory to help understand the roots of the individual
laws that contribute to legal immobility. I argue that there are three distinct
pathways through which these individual laws function: (1) calculated
exploitation, (2) gratuitous management; and (3) routine neglect. In some

cases, through calculated exploitation, states and localities are intentionally
exploiting the poor in order to fund government activities and satisfy more
powerful interest groups. In other cases, states and localities are engaging
in gratuitous management, using the law as a means to control and regulate
the poor. Finally, at times, states are engaging in routine neglect-the poor
are an afterthought, essentially forgotten as the status quo reigns and
systematically makes mobility a distant dream to the least powerful. My
hope is that this framework for understanding the roots of the laws that
together contribute to legal immobility will be helpful for future work that
expands legal immobility research and focuses on normative goals and
change.
One important caveat to note is that the theory of legal immobility is not
meant to be the "holy grail" answer to why upward mobility is so difficult
and poverty perpetuates. Instead, my argument is that to fully understand
16.

EDELMAN, supra note 13; HARRIS, supra note 13; Danial Hummel, Traffic Tickets: Public

Safety Concerns or Budget Building Tools, 47 ADMIN. & Soc. 298 (2014); Sobol, supra note 13.
17.

The Ferguson Report details how many of the operations of the Ferguson police department

and courts disproportionately affect African American residents, beyond their effects on poor residents.
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE

DEPARTMENT 62-80 (March 4,2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/atta
chments/2015/03/04/fergusonpolice department-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9J5-JK6F]. Likewise,
many of the ways in which legal immobility functions in cities and states are even more damaging to
African American citizens due to racial discrimination and increased enforcement of laws in
neighborhoods with large African American populations. The problem is so severe and complex that I

have left this discussion for a second paper on legal immobility, poverty, and race. Thus, in this paper,
I do not specially address race as an added dynamic to the legal immobility argument.
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shows how the structures of state and local laws,
inhibit upward mobility for the poor.
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the role of local and state
disciplines. And when we
poverty emerges, one that
cumulatively, function to

This Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, I consider legal immobility
theory and discuss why we need such a theory. As part of this discussion, I
explore the current state of theory related to law and poverty. In Part II, I
discuss legal immobility and invisible localism in practice, showing how a
confluence of rules and laws across a range of legal areas work together to
stunt mobility. In Part III, I expand on the concepts of calculated
exploitation, gratuitous management, and routine neglect, considering
examples of laws that contribute to legal immobility I discussed in Part II.
In Part IV, I broadly consider some of the implications of legal immobility
theory, and finally, I conclude.
I. WHAT IS LEGAL IMMOBILITY THEORY AND WHY DO WE NEED IT?
In the United States, the study of poverty has long captivated both
scholars and the public." Over a half a century ago, in 1962, Michael
9
Harrington published The Other America,1 drawing wide attention to the
millions of people living in poverty in inner-city housing projects,
Appalachia, and rural America. 20 Not long after, in the 1960s and 1970s,
America launched a war on poverty that helped move millions of people out
of poverty and into the middle class. 2 1 Yet, poverty persists, and today some
22
43.1 million Americans, or 13.5% of the population, live in poverty.
One of the questions that has intrigued generations of scholars is why
poverty is so "sticky," particularly for those who have lived in poverty for
many years.23 Indeed, the more time one has spent in poverty, the lower the
18. John Edwards, Foreword to KATHERINE S. NEWMAN & VICTOR TAN CHEN, THE MISSING
CLASS: PORTRAITS OF THE NEAR POOR IN AMERICA ix (2007) (discussing the interest in the study of

poverty law over time in the United States).
19.

MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA (1962).

20. NEWMAN & CHEN, supra note 18 (discussing the influence of Harrington's book in drawing
attention to poverty in the United States and more generally the role of scholarship in promoting social
and political change).
21. Id.
22.

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 2015: HIGHLIGHTS 12

2
(2016), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/ibrary/publications/ 016/demo/p60-256.pdf [http
s://perma.cc/V8QK-MJ5L].
23. In addition to looking at the mobility potential of an individual over his life course, poverty
researchers also study intergenerational mobility, or the chances that a child living in poverty will exit
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chances the individual will exit poverty.2 4 For those who have lived in
poverty for seven or more years, the chances of exiting poverty are only
thirteen percent.2 5 Further, even for those who do exit poverty, half will
return to poverty within five years of ending a spell.2 6 These statistics show
how difficult upward class mobility can be.
Sociologists, economists, political scientists, and even psychologists
have, for many years, contributed to the theoretical and empirical
discussions about the causes and consequences of the difficultly of longterm upward socioeconomic class mobility for the poor.2 7 Debates rage
about the role of culture in perpetuating poverty,28 and particularly in the
1980s, theorists renewed claims that there were cultural ills infecting those
for whom poverty was persistent.29 They argued that in order to jump-start
upward class mobility for the poor, society had to focus on these cultural
ills.30 Soon William Julius Wilson entered the conversation and argued that
while there may be cultural problems in poor communities, these problems
poverty as an adult. Raj Chetty and others have recently made great strides in predicting various factors
that contribute to upward mobility, including the importance of neighborhoods and even counties. See
Chetty & Hendren, Childhood Exposure Effects, supra note 6; Chetty & Hendren, County Level
Estimates, supra note 6; Chetty et al., Where is the Land of Opportunity?, supra note 6. In this Article,
I focus on the mobility potential of individuals over their life course, rather than on intergenerational

&

mobility. However, legal structures may have implications for intergenerational mobility, and may
indeed help explain Chetty ct al.'s finding that where children grow up, both regionally and by
neighborhood, are predictors of whether children will exit poverty when they are adults. See Chetty
Hendren, Childhood Exposure Effects, supra note 6.
24. Ann Huff Stevens, CTR. FOR POVERTY RESEARCH, Transitions into and out of Poverty in the
United States 1, https://poverty.ucdavis.edu/sites/main/files/file-attachments/policy-brief stevens-pov

erty..transitions_1.pdf[https://perma.cc/SLG3-542F].
25. Id.
26. Singe-Mary McKernan, Caroline Ratcliffe & Stephanie R. Cellini, THE URBAN INST.,
TransitioningIn and Out ofPoverty (Sept. 2009), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/

30636/411956-Transitioning-In-and-Out-of-Poverty.PDF [https://perma.cc/L69X-T3MN].
27. For examples of researchers in each of these disciplines contributing to debates about
poverty, see supra notes 3-7 & infra notes 28, 29, & 31.
28. See, e.g., CULTURE MATTERS: HOW VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS (Lawrence E.
Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington eds., 2000); MICHtLE LAMONT, THE DIGNITY OF WORKING MEN:
MORALITY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF RACE, CLASS, AND IMMIGRATION (2000); Maria Charles, Culture
andInequality: Identity, Ideology, andDifference in "PostascriptiveSociety," 619 ANNALS AM. AcAD.

POL. & Soc. SC. 41 (2008); Paul DiMaggio, Culture and Cognition, 23 ANN. REV. Soc. 263 (1997);
Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, Does CultureAffect Economic Outcomes?, 20 J. ECON.
PERSP. 23 (2006); Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Savings Policy and Decisionmaking in Low
Income Households, in INSUFFICIENT FUNDS 121 (Rebecca M. Blank & Michael S. Barr eds., 2009);
Mario Luis Small, David J. Harding & Michble Lamont, Introduction: Reconsidering Culture and

Poverty, 629 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 6 (2010); Amy Wax & Larry Alexander, Paying the
Pricefor Breakdown ofthe Country'sBourgeois Culture, THE INQUIRER (Aug. 9, 2017), http://www.phi
Ily.com/philly/opinion/commentary/paying-the-price-for-breakdown-of-the-countrys-bourgeois-culture

-20170809.html [https://perma.cc/5J26-PLVN].
29. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP (1986); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950-1980

(1984).
30.

See supra note 29.
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can be attributed to long-standing structural conditions in society." Wilson
argued that a lack of upward socioeconomic class mobility, persistent
poverty, and the accompanying social problems are substantially the result
of structural forces, and thus require responses that are not predicated on the
moral worthiness or reciprocity of those in need.32 Ultimately, Wilson
argued, in order to attack social problems, we need to understand the
structural forces shaping them.33
While some theorists continue to focus on the role of culture in hindering
mobility,3 4 Wilson's insight has led to a prevailing view that structural
forces are as a significant factor in persistent poverty and the difficulty of
upward class mobility. Since Wilson's contribution, a robust literature has
developed that focuses on the various structures in American society that
contribute to persistent poverty. Through careful research, we have come to
understand the centrality of the structural dynamics associated with
39
families,35 education, 36 jobs," the minimum wage, 3 8 neighborhoods, and
cash-based welfare 40 to our understanding of poverty. Entire books have
been devoted to the discussion of each of these areas. 41 Yet law is rarely
central to the analysis of any given structural force that has been studiedeven those institutions that are inherently legal in nature.42
For example, Matthew Desmond's recent work on eviction has received
widespread acclaim, 4 3 with accolades from prominent poverty researchers
31.
32.

WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED, supra note 6.
Id.

33.

Id.

34. See supra note 28. There is also a new line of innovative poverty theory and research that
focuses on the relationship between poverty and cognitive function. See, e.g., Anandi Mani, Sendhil

Mullainathan, Eldar Shafir & Jiaying Zhao, Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function, 341 SC. 976 (2013).

35. See, e.g., ANNETTE LAREAU, UNEQUAL CHILDHOODS: CLASS, RACE, AND FAMILY LIFE
(2003); SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT (1994); Sara

McLanahan & Isabel Sawhill, Marriage and Child Wellbeing Revisited: Introducing the Issue, 25
FUTURE CHILD. 3 (2015).
36. See supra note 4.
37. See generally supra note 4; KATHRYN J. EDIN & H. LUKE SHAEFER, $2.00 A DAY (2015);
KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, NO SHAME IN MY GAME: THE WORKING POOR IN THE INNER CITY (1999).
38. See, e.g., David Neumark & William Wascher, Minimum Wages and Low- Wage Workers:
How Well Does Reality Match the Rhetoric?, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1296 (2008); T. William Lester et al.,

The Facts on Raising the Minimum Wage When Unemployment Is High (June 20, 2012), https://www.am
2

ericanprogressaction.org/issues/economy/news/ 012/06/20/1l749/the-facts-on-raising-the-minimumwage-when-unemployment-is-high-2/ [https://perma.cc/Q5EA-925D].
39. See supra note 6.
40. See, e.g., JASON DEPARLE, AMERICAN DREAM: THREE WOMEN, TEN KIDS, AND ANATION'S
DRIVE TO END WELFARE (2004); KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: How SINGLE
MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND Low-WAGE WORK (1997).
41. See, e.g., supra notes 35-40.
42. See supra notes 35-40 for examples of in-depth discussions of each of these areas that do not
focus on the law.
43. Desmond's book Evicted received a Pulitzer Prize. See The 2017 PulitzerPrize Winner in
General Nonfiction, THE PULITZER PRIZES, https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/matthew-desmond
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suggesting that Desmond's work "refocus[es] our understanding of poverty
in America"" and is "arguably the most important book about poverty in
the United States in a generation." 4 5 Desmond is lauded for his ethnography
and hard-won data, calling attention to an issue that William Julius Wilson
notes is an "eye-opener, even to poverty researchers." 46 Indeed, eviction is
a structure that has profound effects on stunting the potential for upward
class mobility for the poor, yet has rarely been recognized as a key feature
in the persistent poverty and lack of upward socioeconomic class mobility
conversations.
What few have pointed out, however, is that part of what is so novel
about Desmond's work is that at its core, the study of eviction is a study of
a local legalprocess. While Desmond does not delve into the details of the
laws governing eviction in Milwaukee, he does provide a detailed
sociological view of how the process of eviction affects the poor and causes
a cascade of negative events that can trap the poor in poverty and prevent
upward mobility. Desmond's work is transformative, but part of what makes
it transformative is the recognition that a local legal process can have a
profound role in the reproduction of poverty. Eviction, I argue, should be
understood and analyzed not just as a structure in and of itself, but as part
of a much bigger legal structure, a system of laws and rules that perpetuates
poverty.47
One might think that the legal academy would fill in the holes left by
other disciplines in the study of the relationship between law and persistent
poverty, but for the most part, 4 8 poverty is "an ever-present yet often[http://perma.cc/9TPS-32ZDJ. For further praise and accolades, see Praise for Evicted, PENGUIN
RANDOM HOUSE, http://evictedbook.com/praise [http://perma.cc/N842-BLZ4].
44. Praisefor Evicted, supra note 43.

45. Ezra Rosser, Exploiting the Poor:Housing, Markets, and Vulnerability, 126 YALE L.J.F. 458,
458 (2017).
46.

Jennifer Schuessler, A Harvard Sociologist on Watching Families Lose their Homes, N.Y.

TIMEs (Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/20/books/a-harvard-sociologist-on-watching
-families-lose-their-homes.html.
47. Desmond and Monica Bell did write an important review article, Housing, Poverty, and the
Law, 11 ANN. REV. LAW Soc. SCi. 15 (2015). This review article identifies areas at the intersection of

housing, poverty, and the law at both the local and federal level that are ripe for further study. See id.
48. In 1988, for example, the Ford Foundation supplied funding to create the Interuniversity
Consortium on Poverty Law. The idea originated from "a series of discussions" that took place at
Harvard Law School in 1985-86, which centered on the "resistances that confronted legal academics in
their attempts to transform legal scholarship or institutions." Gabrielle Lessard, IntroductionINTERUNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM ON POVERTY LAW TOWARD THE MOBILIZATION OF LAW SCHOOL FOR
POVERTYLA WADVOCACY, 42 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 57, 58 (1992) (final report to the Ford Foundation
on Two Years of Activity, under grant 890-0427-1). The group "envisioned the Consortium as a network

enabling academics struggling against resistances at dispersed law schools to collectively support one
another." Id. at 58. The two stated goals of the Consortium were to "increase law school scholarship,
teaching, and understanding of poverty law and the relationship between law and poverty" and to "link
this scholarship, teaching, and understanding with advocacy on behalf of poor, disadvantaged, and
marginalized persons and organizations that promote their interests." Id. at 58. See also Howard S.
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neglected aspect of the study of law." 4 9 Thus, we are left with a dearth of
scholarship on the ways in which the structural forces of the law,
specifically, perpetuate poverty and lead to socioeconomic class
immobility.
There are, however, two key areas that are a significant exception to this
dearth of law-related scholarship, particularly in the last several years. First,
the structures related to criminal law and their effects on poverty have
recently garnered significant scholarly attention. These structures have been
analyzed at several different levels, as described below.
Research has revealed the striking role of incarceration in perpetuating
and exacerbating poverty. 50 Incarceration rates have "more than quadrupled
in the past four decades,"' and while more work still needs to be done, mass
incarceration has received relatively extensive scholarly attention compared
to other law-related structures that perpetuate poverty. One study used three
different poverty indexes and in each case found that incarceration
significantly increased poverty.5 2 Further, the study found that but for mass
incarceration, the official poverty rate would have significantly decreased
during the time period studied." Since those with criminal records have
trouble finding housing and employment,5 4 two key facets of economic
independence, it should come as no surprise that mass incarceration
contributes to persistent poverty.
A second area of criminal law that scholars have made recent innovations
into understanding is that of mass misdemeanors. The scholars who first
began studying mass misdemeanors noted that little attention had been paid
to low-level misdemeanor arrests and citations despite their widespread
prevalence." The number of charges for misdemeanors such as possession
Erlanger & Gabrielle Lessard, Mobilizing Law Schools in Response to Poverty: A Report on Experiments

in Progress, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 199, 199 (1993).
49. JULIET M. BRODIE, CLARE PASTORE, EZRA ROSSER & JEFFREY SELBIN, POVERTY LAW:
POLICY AND PRACTICE 1 (2014).
50. Robert H. DeFina & Lance Hannon, The Impact ofMass Incarcerationon Poverty, 59 CRIME
& DELINQUENCY 562 (2009); WESTERN, supra note 5, at 29-32.
51. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
EXPLORING CAUSE AND CONSEQUENCES 1 (2014), https://johnjay.jjay.cuny.eduL/nrc/NAS-report-on-in

carceration.pdf [https://perma.cc/3N H9-KWQK].
52.

DeFina & Hannon, supra note 50, at 566.

53.

Id.

54.

PAGER, supra note 5; see also JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 43

(2015).
55.

Issa Kohler-Hausmann, ManagerialJustice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611,

612-13 (2014) ("This Article explores another recent expansion of penal operations that has received
remarkably little attention: the rise of mass misdemeanors."); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S.

CAL. L. REV. 101, 102-03 (2012) ("An estimated ten million misdemeanor cases are filed annually ...
. While these individuals are largely ignored by the criminal literature and policy makers, they are
nevertheless punished, stigmatized, and burdened by their convictions in many of the same ways as their
felony counterparts.").
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of marijuana, trespass, and public urination, for example, have significantly
increased in the past decade. 56 Scholars of mass misdemeanors have rightly
pointed out that it is not just incarceration and what is thought of as
traditional criminal law that can serve to inhibit mobility-less severe
criminal charges can too.57 They argue that while many misdemeanor

charges are dismissed, the collateral consequences of having a criminal
record, even for a misdemeanor or dismissed charge, can exacerbate poverty
and already difficult conditions.
Finally, legal scholars have made some important headway in
understanding the relationship between criminalization and poverty-what
scholars refer to as the criminalization of poverty.59 Particularly since the
important work of the Department of Justice in the Ferguson Report,
scholars have expanded the work of the Ferguson Report to draw attention
to the idea that, as Peter Edelman has said, "Ferguson is Everywhere." 6 0
Edelman and others have noted many ways in which the poor face criminal
consequences such as incarceration due almost entirely to the fact that they
are poor.6 1 For example, this can happen when they cannot afford to pay
child support,62 when they are stuck in jail awaiting a trial because they
cannot afford bail,63 when they are confused about public benefits but end
up being charged with fraud," and when they cannot pay probation fees. 6 5
The other key area of scholarly innovation concerning the law's
relationship to poverty is the study of struggling cities and regions. Michelle
Wilde Anderson's path-breaking work focuses on cities that in the postindustrial era have suffered extreme financial problems, sometimes
ultimately dissolving into regions or filing for municipal bankruptcy. 66
Anderson's work highlights the specific challenges for poor residents living
in these areas and the ways in which the laws, policies, and decisions about
services and resources in these struggling cities can mean that these areas
"are unable to provide the basic cornerstones of American upward social
mobility-personal safety and education opportunity." 67
56.

57.
58.
59.

See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 55, at 629-33.

See Natapoff, supra note 55, at 104-05.
See id.
For example, Part I of Peter Edelman's book, NOT A CRIME TO BE POOR: THE
CRIMINALIZ4TONOFPOVERTYINAMERICA
is called "The Criminalization of Poverty." EDELMAN, supra
note 13, at 3-156.
60. See id. at 3.
61. See generally, id.
62. See id. at 83-90.
63. See id. at 45-62.
64. See id. at 93-115.
65. See id. at 11-15.
66. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118 (2014);
Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364 (2012).
67. Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, supra note 66, at 1184.
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Considering these struggling regions, David Schleicher has argued that
members of disadvantaged groups who live in these areas would likely be
better off moving to other regions of the country that offer more
opportunities for upward socioeconomic mobility. 6 8 However, he argues,
people are stuck in these failing regions in part because of specific state and
local laws that make interstate mobility difficult. 69 In other words,
Schleicher suggests that there should be more interstate mobility in order to
improve the economic outlooks of disadvantaged groups, but that formal
70
legal structures have created barriers to such residential mobility. Thus,
the goal should be to alleviate these legal barriers." Michelle Wilde
Anderson, Naomi Schoenbaum, and others have raised important questions
about whether the policy of easing interstate mobility alone will actually
make a meaningful difference in promoting mobility (both interstate
mobility and socioeconomic mobility).7 2
For the purposes of legal immobility theory, the contribution of this
discussion is that in considering the laws and policies leading to legal
immobility, we must consider the fiscal health of cities and regions and thus
the underlying reasons for the laws and policies. Indeed, there is little doubt
that these conversations about the financial health of cities and regions are
an important part of the concept of legal immobility, and the calculated
exploitation prong of legal immobility theory takes into account these
concerns.
However, legal immobility theory takes a broader view, beyond
struggling cities and regions. The theory considers the many laws and
policies that are not unique to struggling cities, yet damper economic.
opportunity for the poor. We need to consider these avenues of suppression
in conjunction with laws and policies that stem from the fiscal problems of
struggling cities. This will allow us to better understand how the law
functions as a mechanism through which poverty is perpetuated and upward
socioeconomic mobility is stunted.
Indeed, legal immobility theory draws on Wilson's original argument
that persistent poverty and immobility is substantially the result of structural
forces. However, I argue that while we have been focusing on many

68. Schleicher, supra note 14, at 82-83.
69. Id. at 84.
70. Id. at 82-84.
71. Id. at 149-154.
72. See Anderson, supra note 14, at 522 (arguing that in order to make meaningful improvement
to mobility, a "new antipoverty agenda" for declining regions is needed, as is "fiscal and environmental
responsibility for the existing infrastructure debts of our prior regional and interstate mobility.");
Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 464-70 (arguing that there are important costs to interstate mobility
Schleicher does not take into account and that there are also values of place that Schleicher fails to
consider).
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different types of structures, we have been, in a sense, missing the
scaffolding: the cumulative effects of state and local laws that may, at first
glance, seem to have little to do specifically with the lives of the poor. In
some cases, scholars like Desmond have identified structures that are
inherently legal in nature (i.e. eviction), but their relationship to the law has
been mostly forgotten.73 The first piece of legal immobility theory is the
recognition that legal structures need to be considered as a mechanism that
thwarts upward mobility. Legal structures have thus far been largely
missing from the conversation, even though persistent poverty and
immobility is as much of a legal phenomenon as it is anything else.
Second, legal immobility theory postulates that many of the legal
structures we have been missing in relationship to persistent poverty are
local in nature. Because they are local in nature, they can vary from state to
state and even from town to town, making them more difficult to recognize
and categorize. But we must look for patterns in local and state law and
compare varying localities in order to more fully understand how these
invisible and seemingly minor laws can lead to socioeconomic immobility.
Finally, a key feature of legal immobility theory is the recognition that
the disadvantages local and state laws may bring to the poor are cumulative
m nature. Just one law that disproportionately burdens the poor might not
have dramatic effects on the ultimate life trajectory of the person affected
by it. But it is the processes of each individual law, cumulatively combined
with the processes of so many other areas of law that are underexplored or
even unexplored, that make sustained upward mobility so difficult for the
poor. Criminal law, tax law, zoning law, family law and others, interacting
together, create a legal structure that contributes to legal immobility. We
need more deep engagement by legal scholars with the relationship between
poverty and the law on a cumulative basis, calling attention to the role of
law across a wide range of areas in perpetuating poverty. Scholars need to
further explore the potential that the cumulative nature of these laws,
experienced in conjunction with one another, is a significant factor in
making the climb out of poverty so difficult.
It is important to again acknowledge that this Article is not empirical in
nature and is not and cannot make any causal claims about the role of state
and local laws in perpetuating poverty or stunting upward class mobility.
The Article instead argues that we need to considerthe potential cumulative
effects of state and local laws that disproportionately disadvantage the poor
in perpetuating poverty and stunting upward class mobility. While this
Article is informed by my over ten years of qualitative interviews with poor
and near poor residents in several different cities, it is not based specifically
73.

See e.g., Desmond, supra note 7.
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on these data.
Ultimately legal immobility theory recognizes that law is in fact the
infrastructure of daily life, the mesh of enablement or impediment that adds
up over a life course, often in ways that are undramatic and hard to see. We
need a vocabulary for discussing the role of this legal structure in affecting
poverty-thus, legal immobility. Indeed, the purpose of legal immobility
theory is to give scholars a language and umbrella under which to undertake
this type of inquiry.
II. LEGAL IMMOBILITY IN PRACTICE

How does legal immobility work in practice? One potentially useful
thought process is to imagine the health of a human being and the various
ailments and diseases that can affect the human body. Just one disease,
depending on the nature of it, can certainly work alone to wreak havoc on
the human body and one's health. But there are many health conditions that
alone can be overcome. It is only when these conditions interact,
cumulatively, with other conditions, that their negative impact is magnified
and potentially devastating.
Imagine, for example, a woman named Joanne. Joanne is in good health
but for arthritis in her hands. The arthritis is painful, and it is difficult for
Joanne to grip objects and type on a computer, but overall she functions
fairly normally. Now, imagine Joanne develops type two diabetes. The
diabetes has a variety of symptoms, and in order to help control it, Joanne
must give herself a shot of insulin each day. However, her arthritis makes it
so painful to grip the insulin injector that Joanne sometimes skips a dose of
insulin. This, in turn, results in her diabetes causing other symptomsJoanne's eyesight declines rapidly, and her feet and ankles are often
painfully swollen. This swelling results in a reduction of exercise because
walking becomes painful.
One day when Joanne is cutting fruit, she cuts her finger badly, partially
due to her blurred vision. After getting the cut attended to in the emergency
room, she goes home, now with even further limits to her hand mobility.
The cut gets infected, possibly due to her diabetes, which makes healing
more difficult, and she has to again be attended to at the doctor's office and
take strong antibiotics.
The story could continue, with more and more ailments interacting with
one another and cumulatively making Joanne unable to function.
Individually, some of the ailments are minor, but taken together, they can
make it almost impossible for Joanne to be employed and generally be a
productive citizen. In the same vain, each legal obstacle that someone living
in poverty encounters as part of legal immobility can function in the same
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way as any one of Joanne's ailments: individually, not necessarily
demobilizing, but collectively almost impossible to overcome. Below, I
detail just some of the many local and state legal rules and systems that
contribute to legal immobility. While it is unlikely any one person would be
affected by all of the areas detailed below, the idea is to consider just how
pervasive these immobilizing laws are and to recognize that there are many
more such laws I am unable to touch upon in this Article.
A. State and Local Taxes
Generally, when scholars consider and debate the relative progressive
verses regressive nature of tax, they are consumed with the federal tax
code.74 There is an ongoing debate in the United States about the fairness of
the federal income tax, but an enduring principle in the United States
concerning federal taxes is that those who make more should pay more.
Indeed, the federal income tax system is progressive, with higher-income
households paying a larger percentage of their income than lower-income
households." In general, tax is often left out of the poverty discussion
altogether. 76
When scholars do focus on the connection between poverty and taxation,
they usually focus on the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC),77 a tax program
implemented during the Nixon administration that made the federal tax
system even more progressive.7 ' The EITC is designed to incentivize work
by providing families with an increased tax return/credit based on their
income. 7 9 Scholars have written about (and debated) the utility and design
of the EITC,s 0 as well as the concern about EITC fraud (those who file for
74. See KATHERINE S. NEWMAN & ROURKE L. O'BRIEN, TAXING THE POOR xxxix (2011)
("Economists interested in public finance and law professors who dwell on the intricacies of taxation

are generally prcoccupied with federal statutes.").
75.

Are FederalTaxes Progressive?,TAX POLICY CENTER BRIEFING BOOK, https://www.taxpoli

cycenter.org/briefing-book/are-federal-taxes-progressive [http://perma.cc/HHH3-8GUX].
76.

NEWMAN & O'BRIEN, supra note 74, at xxxviii.

77.

Id. However, a few scholars have gone beyond the EITC in considering the relationship

between tax and poverty. For example, in her article Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging
Reconsidered, Lily Batchelder argues that taxation of annual income disproportionately burdens low-

income families. She proposes two ways to address this problem, one involving the EITC (averaging
the EITC over a two-year period) but also one that would carry back the standard deduction and
personal and dependent exemptions. See Lily L. Batchelder, Taxing the Poor, Income Averaging
Reconsidered, 40 HARV. J. ON LEG. 395 (2003). Further, David Kamin has written about the potential

utility of the tax system overall in decreasing poverty. See David Kamin, Reducing Poverty, Not
Inequality: What Changes in the Tax System Can Achieve, 66 TAX L. REv. 593 (2013).
78.

See Sara Sternberg Greene, The Broken Safety Net: A Study of Earned Income Tax Credit

Recipients and a Proposalfor Repair, 88 N.Y.U. L. REv. 515, 530-32 (2013).
79. See id. at 533-36.
80.

See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, The EarnedIncome Tax Creditand the Limitations of Tax-Based

Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995); Anne L. Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn't Make Work
Pay, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285 (2010); Greene, supra note 78; Lawrence Zelenak, Redesigningthe
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and receive the EITC but do not actually qualify)," and EITC take-up
rates. 82

Few scholars, however, have focused on the intricacies of state and local
level taxation, even though state and local taxes can have significant effects
on the lives of the poor. Tax laws concerning sales taxes, renter's credits,
state level refundable earned income and child tax credits, utility bill
deductions, deductions and subsidies for public transit commuter expenses,
and more are all important in determining the net take-home pay of poor
families.8 3 Indeed, a 2015 study by the nonprofit Institute on Taxation and
Economic Policy ("ITEP Study"), a nonpartisan research firm that studies
tax issues, found that state and local tax burdens on the poor, as compared
to higher income groups, are profound.84 The poorest twenty percent of
Americans pay an average effective state and local tax rate of 10.9%,
whereas the top one percent of Americans have an effective state and local
tax burden of just 5.4%.8 While there are some states with particularly
regressive tax systems, "[v]irtually every state tax system is fundamentally
unfair, taking a much greater share of income from low- and middle-income
families than from wealthy families." 86 Even states like California, which
was identified as one of the fairer states, places a 10.5% effective tax rate
on the bottom twenty percent of its residents, but only a 8.7% burden on the
top one percent.87 Meanwhile, however, California is indeed fairer than
many states, including the ten states with the most regressive tax
structures." In these states, which include Washington, Florida, Texas,
South Dakota, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Arizona, Kansas and
Indiana, "the bottom 20 percent pay up to seven times as much of their
income in taxes as their wealthy counterparts." 89 Some of the most
90
regressive state tax systems rely to a large degree on sales and excise taxes,
and most states that are considered "low tax" (usually because they do not
Earned Income Tax Credit As a Family-Size Adjustment to the Minimum Wage, 57 TAX L. REV. 301

(2004).
81. See, e.g., Joel Barker & Chadrick Frederick, Billions Lost Yearly to Earned Income Tax
Credit: Errorsor Fraud?, 14 J. BuS. & ECON. RES. 145 (2016); Janet McCubbin, EITC Noncompliance:
The Determinantsof the Misreportingof Children, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 1135 (2000).
82.

See, e.g., John Karl Scholz, The Earned Income Tax Credit: Participation,Compliance, and

Antipoverty Effectiveness, 47 NAT'L TAX J. 63 (1994); Oleg Urminsky & Indranil Goswami, Designing
Effective Choice Architectures, 40 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 298 (2012).
83. NEWMAN & O'BRIEN, supra note 74, at xxxix.
84. CARL DAVIS ET AL., INSTIT. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, WHO PAYS: A DISTRIBUTIONAL
ANALYSIS OF THE TAX SYSTEMS IN ALL 50 STATES 1 (Jan. 2015), https:/itep.org/wp-content/uploads/W

hopaysreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/T453-GYKA].
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 38.
88. See id. at 7.
89. Id. at 1.
90. Id.
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have a state income tax), are actually high tax states for low- and middleincome families. 9 1

These findings of the ITEP Study are consistent with those of scholars
Katherine Newman and Rourke O'Brien, who completed a comprehensive
study that found that there are profound regional differences in the way the
poor are taxed. 92 The study found that tax policy is particularly regressive
in the South and the West-in the last thirty years, Southern states have
systematically increased the tax burden on their poorest citizens by "shifting
the support of the public sector to sales taxes and fees for public services." 9 3
And beginning in 1978, when California voters passed Proposition 13, a cap
on property-tax increases, Western states too began increasing sales taxes
at the relative expense of the poor in order to make up for the revenue they
were losing due to the property tax caps. 94
Further, consistent with the ITEP Study, Newman and Chen found that
though taxes, particularly taxes as seemingly minor as the sales tax, may not
appear to connect with poverty and mobility outcomes, they do. 95 For those
living on very limited incomes, taxes on food, clothing, school supplies, car
registration, bus fares, when combined, are a much greater percentage of a
low-income household's budget than such expenses are for wealthier
households. For example, a working mother in Vermont would end up with
$2,300 more than a working mother in Mississippi, if the two mothers both
had two dependent children, poverty-level wages, and the same spending
patterns." This means that due to the differences in tax rates for the poor in
each of these states, including various refunds and regressive sales taxes,
essentially the same poor mother living in Mississippi would have $2,300
less per year in disposable income than she would if she lived in Vermont.
If this mother was making $23,000 per year, the additional $2,300 it costs
to live in Mississippi due to taxes is ten percent of her income-a significant
amount.
Newman and O'Brien analyzed data from forty-nine states between 1982
and 2009. They examined the "combined burden of the sales tax and state
and local income taxes on poor households." 97 They considered the
"relationship between the total tax burden on a poor family of three and
91.

Id. at 2.

92.
93.

NEWMAN & O'BRIEN, supra note 74, at 128-31.
Katherine S. Newman, In the South and West, a Tax on Being Poor, N.Y. TIMES (March 9,

2013), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/09/in-the-south-and-west-a-tax-on-being-poor/
[https://perma.cc/DGE2-BRVV].
94. Id.

95. Id. ("It turns out that after factoring out all other explanations . . . the relationship between
taxing the poor and negative outcomes like premature death persisted."

96.
97.

Id.
Id.
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state-level figures for mortality, morbidity, teenage childbearing, dropping
out of high school, property crime, and violent crime."" They then
controlled for many other explanations, such as racial composition, poverty
rates, the amount spent on education or health care, the size of the state's
economy, existing inequality levels, and differences in the cost of living.
Even when controlling for all of these factors, there was a significant
relationship between taxing the poor and several negative outcomes. They
found that "for every $100 increase on taxes at the poverty line, there were
an additional seven deaths and seventy-eight property crimes per 100,000
people and a quarter of a percentage point decrease in high school
completion." 99
Newman and O'Brien's work shows that independently, state and local
tax policies matter for determining outcomes for poor families. As legal
immobility theory would suggest, when these policies are combined with
other legal policies that disproportionately burden the poor, the effect is
likely even more profound.
B. Nuisance Laws
Public nuisance laws have existed in the United States since the time of
the Pilgrims, having come via the English common law.'" The definition of
a public nuisance varies by locality, but broadly a public nuisance is defined
as a crime that is an act or omission that obstructs, damages, or
inconveniences the public community. This can include things ranging from
bright lights, disturbing the peace, loitering, vagrancy, major health hazards,.
and a wide range of other actions and situations. Now, every state has some
form of public nuisance laws in their statutes, and beginning in the 1980s,
local municipalities began enacting chronic nuisance ordinances and
disorderly housing ordinances. o' In the early 1990s, a new version of the
102
It is estimated
concept was conceived-crime-free housing ordinances.
that about 2,000 municipalities in forty-four states have enacted some kind
of nuisance/crime free ordinance, with Illinois leading the way-more than
130 municipalities in Illinois have enacted such ordinances.' 03
As part of these crime-free ordinances, municipalities started focusing
04
on 911 calls and established a nuisance of 911-abuse' -the law in several
98.
99.

Id.
Id.

100. EDELMAN, supra note 13, at 137.

101. Id. at 137-38.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 138.
104. Matthew Desmond & Nicol Valdez, Unpolicing the Urban Poor: Consequences of ThirdParty PolicingforInner-City Women, 78 Am. Soc. REv. 117, 131 (2012).
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localities is that calling 911 three times in a certain period of time constitutes
a chronic nuisance.'s These 911-abuse ordinances of course vary, but they
tend to have three common characteristics. First, properties are designated
as a nuisance based on a certain number of calls, deemed to be excessive,
made during a specified timeframe.o6 Second, they contain a broad list of
defined "nuisance activities" for which the calls are made.o7 Finally, they
require that property owners either abate the nuisance or face fines, property
forfeiture, and in some cases, incarceration.' 08 In localities that have them,
911-abuse nuisances are widely enforced. For example, a study of nuisance
activities in Milwaukee, Wisconsin found that 911-abuse was the fourth
most common type of nuisance citation (out of fifteen possible categories)
in the city, constituting 13.1% of all recorded nuisances. 0 9
Consider how a nuisance-911 ordinance in a locality where simply
calling 911, no matter the reason, three times or more in a set period of time
is deemed 911 -abuse, might play out for someone who lives in a high-crime
area. Generally, the role of 911 is thought to be in part a safe number for
someone to call when they witness a drug deal or a domestic violence
situation, perhaps suffer a robbery in their own apartment building, and the
like. But for people living in municipalities with a nuisance ordinance that
considers calling 911 too many times 911 -abuse and thus a nuisance, calling
911 to report such crimes can lead to significant negative consequences for
the good citizen simply reporting crimes.
And these 911-abuse nuisance laws disproportionately disadvantage the
poor since high-crime neighborhoods are disproportionately low-income." 0
In some cases, people who report crime might feel vulnerable while they
are witnessing a crime, and it punishes them for simply seeking help from
the police, even though responding to a crime scene is generally considered
a fundamental duty of the police. If people cannot call the police to report a
crime and seek help, it is not clear who they can call.
In many cases a property is cited for a nuisance due to "excessive" 911
calling without the tenant even being warned beforehand that she is close to
a citation."' But once a landlord's property is cited and the landlord is told
by the police to abate the nuisance, the landlord often turns to evicting the

105. EDELMAN, supra note 13, at 139.

106. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 104, at 120.
107. Id.
108. Id.; Cari Fais, Note, DenyingAccess toJustice: The Cost ofApplying ChronicNuisanceLaws
to Domestic Violence, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1181, 1188 (2008).
109. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 104, at 131.
110. U.S. DEP'T HousING & URB. DEV., EVIDENCE MATTERS (2016), https://www.huduser.gov/

portal/periodicals/em/summerl 6/highlight2.html [http://perma.cc/D6CP-UHH2] ("Neighborhoods with
more concentrated disadvantage tend to experience higher levels of violent crime.").
111. EDELMAN, supra note 13, at 139.
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tenant as the way to abate the nuisance.11 2 In the study of Milwaukee
discussed above, out of the 243 property owners included in the sample, 118
(or forty-nine percent) initiated or executed a formal eviction.113 Further,
190 (or seventy-eight percent), invoked a landlord-initiated forced move,
which meant formal evictions, informal evictions, and threats to evict if the
nuisance continued. 14
As Peter Edelman writes, the landlord generally turns to eviction or a
forced move because he can otherwise be "fined, jailed, lose his license [to
rent properties], have a lien placed on the property, or even see his building
condemned or shuttered.""' Landlords cannot easily protest ordinance
citations-they would have to allow themselves to be arrested and then roll
the dice of contesting the charges in jail. Thus, landlords generally turn to
the easier solution of evicting their tenants." 6 As one of the Milwaukee
landlords said, "I evict them . . . Look, you're rolling the dice if you don't
evict the tenant. Because [the police] want the problem eliminated. Not
gradually fixed, but totally eliminated. A five-day [eviction] notice is
exactly what the police want.""'
The consequences of evictions can be devastating for poor tenants.
"[L]andlords often turn away applicants with recent evictions on their
records," and thus, people who have been evicted regularly experience both
8
"prolonged periods of homelessness and increased residential mobility.""
Researchers have found that even when evicted people do find housing, they
often end up in substandard conditions in disadvantaged neighborhoods
9
because that is the only housing they can find available to them.1 Not only
is it difficult for families who have faced an eviction to find market-rate
rental housing, but eviction can also disqualify families for housing subsidy
programs. 2 0
The impact of eviction goes beyond material-deprivation problems.
Studies have found a relationship between eviction and mental health issues.
For example, one study found that having experienced an eviction is a risk
factor for suicide.' 2 ' Another study found mothers who had experienced
112. Id.
113. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 104, at 131.
114. Id.
115. EDELMAN, supra note 13, at 139.

116. Id.
117. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 104, at 131-32.
118. Matthew Desmond, Weihua An, Richelle Winkler & Thomas Ferriss, Evicting Children, 92
Soc. FORCES 303, 303 (2013) (citing Martha Burt, Homeless Families, Singles, and Others: Findings
from the 1996 National Survey of Homeless Assistance Providers and Clients, 12 HOUSING POL'Y
DEBATE 737 (2001); Maureen Crane & Anthony Warnes, Evictions and ProlongedHomelessness, 15

HOUSiNG STUD. 757 (2000)).
119. Desmond, An, Winkler, & Ferriss, supra note 118, at 303.
120. Id.
121. Michael Serby, David Brody, Shetal Amin & Philip Yanowitch, Eviction as a Risk Factor
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eviction in the previous year were more likely to suffer from depression,
material hardship, and parenting stress than those who had avoided
eviction.' 22 They were also more likely to report poor health for themselves
and their children than those who had avoided eviction.1 2 3
Taken alone, these studies show how devastating nuisance laws can be
for poor people who happen to fall victim to them. For people who are
evicted due to nuisance laws, it is the law itself that is causing their decline
in mobility-without such nuisance laws, they would have otherwise been
able to stay in their homes. In their case, it was not failure to pay rent (which
can be associated with a complex web of poverty policies and issues such
as job loss, medical insurance, etc.) that caused the eviction, but rather the
law itself. This is legal immobility at work, and when we consider the
cumulative effects of nuisance laws and other laws that disproportionately
burden the poor, we see how state and local laws can play a significant role
in leading to immobility and perpetuating poverty.
Finally, there is another type of nuisance ordinance enforcement that
contributes to legal immobility-one in which the landlord is entirely at
fault, but the tenant bears the burden of the landlord's mistake(s). These are
cases where the law requires landlords to be licensed in order to operate
rental housing and also call for the revocation of the landlord's license due
to non-compliance with any number of local building and/or property
maintenance codes.' 2 4 Minor violations such as high grass, for example, can
result in a landlord losing his license.1 2 5 In many cases these minor
violations do not affect "the habitability of the property." 26 However, the
law can then require that the landlord immediately vacate his propert(ies),
meaning that innocent tenants are forced to bear the burden of moving out
of their rental housing, essentially being evicted through absolutely no fault
of their own.' 2 7 While not a formal eviction, for a poor family, the burden
of having to move can mean financial ruin. The cost of moving possessions
alone is significant, not to mention coming up with a new security deposit
and first month's rent, buying goods needed for a new property, and finding
the time needed to secure a new rental property can all be difficult and
contribute to significant financial and emotional burdens on poor families.

&

for Suicide, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 273, 273 (2006).
122. Matthew Desmond & Rachel Tolbert Kimbro, Eviction's Fallout. Housing, Hardship,
Health, 94 Soc. FORCES 295, 312 (2015).
123. Id.

124. EMILY WERTH, SHRIVER NAT'L CENT. ON POVERTY LAW, THE COST OF BEING "CRIME
FREE": LEGAL AND PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIME FREE RENTAL HOUSING AND NUISANCE

PROPERTY ORDINANCES 17 (2013), http://www.povertylaw.org/files/docs/cost-of-being-crime-free.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3NVZ-A5FY].
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. See id.

A THEORY OF POVERTY

2019]

775

C. OccupationalLicensing Laws
Occupational licensing laws vary by state and locality, but generally,
they are laws requiring government permission to work and get paid in a
specified field. 128 There are various hoops these licenses require applicants
to jump through, often including residency and citizenship requirements,
general education benchmarks, benchmarks as to the amount of
education/training in the field, specific passing scores on an exam in the
field, letters from current field practitioners attesting to factors such as
moral character, and ultimately paying fees for an operating license after
these hurdles are passed.1 29
The number of workers who are required to have occupational licenses
has increased significantly since the 1950s.130 Indeed, at that time only one
in twenty workers, or about 4.5%, 131 needed such licenses; today almost one
in three workers, or about twenty-nine percent, are required to have an
occupational license.' 3 2 Most (at least two-thirds) of this rise comes from an
increase in the number of professions that require a license, rather than a
growth in the number of positions available within already licensed
professions.

33

The main public policy justifications for requiring occupational licenses
focus on the role such regulation plays in "protect[ing] the health and safety
of consumers and ensuring a sufficiently high level" of service or product
offered. 3 4 However, particularly in low-wage jobs, there is wide variation
among states both in terms of whether an occupation must be licensed at all
1 35
and what the requirements for any given occupational license are.
128. See DICK M. CARPENTER II, LISA KNEPPER, ANGELA C. ERICKSON & JOHN K ROSS, INST.
FOR JUSTICE, LICENSE TO WORK: A NATIONAL STUDY OF BURDENS FROM OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING

4 (2012), http://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/licensetoworkl.pdf

[http://perma.cc/TJL2-MTPZ];

MORRIS M. KLEINER, THE BROOKINGS INST., REFORMING OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING POLICIES 5

(2015)

http://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/licensetoworkl.pdf

[http://perma.cc/27VH-K2BQI

[hereinafter KLEINER, REFORMING OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING].
129. CARPENTER, KNEPPER, ERICKSON & ROSS, supra note 128, at 7; MORRIS M. KLEINER,
LICENSING OCCUPATIONS: ENSURING QUALITY OR RESTRICTING COMPETITION? 8 (2006) [hereinafter
KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS]. In a poll that asked workers what requirements were required to
achieve their license or certification, over three-quarters said that a high school diploma was necessary,
almost half said a college degree was required, and almost ninety percent said they needed to pass an
exam. Several also reported that it was necessary to keep up with continuing education and internships.
KLEINER, REFORMING OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING, supra note 128, at 8.
130. KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS, supra note 129, at 1 (2006).

131. Id.
132. KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS, supra note 128, at 5.
133. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY OFFICE OF ECON. POL'Y, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS & U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS 20 (2015)
[hereinafter OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS].
134. KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS, supra note 129, at 8; KLEINER, REFORMING
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING, supra note 128, at 5.
135. KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS, supra note 128, at I1.
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Indeed, one key study that examined the scope of occupational licensing
laws for low- and moderate-income occupations among all fifty states found
that of the 102 occupations studied, only fifteen require a license in forty
states or more.' 36 Further, on average, the 102 occupations are licensed in
fewer than half the states-just twenty-two states. ' And there were five
occupations that required licenses in only one state ("florist, forest worker,
fire sprinkler system tester, conveyor operator, and non-contractor
pipelayer").1 38 Some occupations require a license in very few states, but in
the states where a license is required, it is very difficult to obtain. For
example, in the states that require interior designers to become licensed, the
hurdles required in order to obtain the license were found to be some of the
most difficult of all occupations using a systematic ranking formula. A
national exam must be passed, an average of $364 in fees must be paid, and
an average of 2,200 days, or six years, must be devoted to a combination of
education and apprenticeship.' 3 9 Yet a license to be an interior designer is
only required in three states and Washington, DC. 14 0
This wide variation points to the questionable need for such licensing in
certain occupations.141 As the authors of the study point out, "it is rather
implausible that interior design poses a health and safety risk in these four
jurisdictions that is absent everywhere else (let alone a risk severe enough
to warrant requiring would-be-designers to complete six years of education
and training)." 42 The authors further note that several state commissions
that have studied the issue have concluded that there is no need to license
interior designers, and have thus recommended against proposed licensing
schemes for them.1 4 3
Some states, like Louisiana, require occupational licenses for seventyone of the 102 occupations studied, while Wyoming only required licenses
for twenty-four of the occupations, and Vermont and Kentucky only
twenty-seven.1 4 4 As the authors of the study note, "[e]ven allowing for
variation in states that may change the nature or popularity of some
occupations across borders, this lack of consistency is suspect. For the vast
majority of these licensed occupations, many people are practicing
elsewhere without government permission and apparently without

136. CARPENTER, KNEPPER, ERICKSON & Ross, supra note 128, at 15.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id. at 18.
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widespread harm."1 4 5
Not only is there a question about the need for some occupations to be
licensed at all, but data also show that there are sometimes fairly arbitrary
burdens on applicants for occupations that are licensed in many states,
depending on where they live.1 46 Indeed, not only is there wide variation
among states in what occupations and how many require licensing, there is
also wide variation among states in what the burden of a license for a
specific occupation iS.1 47 In Iowa, for example, 490 days of education and
training are required in order to become a licensed cosmetologist, even
though the national average is 372 days, and Massachusetts and New York
require only 233 days.1 4 8
Finally, variations in how much training is required for certain
professions within the same state seem arbitrary: in Michigan, one must
train for 1,460 days in order to become a licensed athletic trainer, but only
14 9
It
twenty-six days to become an emergency medical technician (EMT).
is hard to argue that these licensing requirements are directly related to the
health and safety of consumers, since EMTs are often dealing with life and
death situations.
Commentators have suggested that occupational licensing can be
particularly costly to low-income individuals in two key ways. First, studies
have found that licensing reduces employment growth and limits job
opportunities, particularly for low-income people.' 5 The commentators
found that the additional hurdles licensing requires may drive lower-income
people "into lower-paying but more accessible jobs."'"' This is not
surprising because not only are there actual licensing fees to be paid, but
time and money are necessary in order to attend the trade-school courses
required for licensing.' 5 2 Many low-income people do not have access to
money to fund such courses. Further, they usually must work full-time (and
sometimes more) in order to pay their bills, so finding time to take such
training courses may also be unrealistic. Ultimately, these restrictions on the
types of jobs poor people are able to obtain contribute to legal immobility;
the poor are stuck in jobs with less opportunity for growth and less
opportunity to move into more lucrative positions, which in turn of course
145. Id. at 25.
146. Id. at 26.
147. KLEINER, REFORMING OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING, supra note 128, at 11.

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 6.
151. Id.; see also CARPENTER, KNEPPER, ERICKSON & Ross, supra note 128, at 25.
152. Edward Rodrigue & Richard V. Reeves, Four Ways OccupationalLicensing DamagesSocial

Mobility, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/social-mobility-memos/
2016/02/24/four-ways-occupational-licensing-damages-social-mobility/ [https://perma.cc/YNQ3-VPC
L].
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.

makes upward socioeconomic mobility much more difficult.
Finally, occupational licensing can be particularly costly for low-income
people because the requirements can lead to "fewer practitioners in a given
area, especially in lower-income occupations, and higher prices paid
[for] services."' 53 Thus, this can mean reduced access to the services,
resulting in a net regressive result because lower-income consumers have to
both pay more for the services and have less access to them.1 5 4
D. Child Welfare Laws
It is well-documented that the child welfare system disproportionately
involves families living in poverty.'1 5 One study found that of the parent
neglect cases handled by child protection services, more than eighty percent
involve unmarried mothers living in poverty. 56 Further, studies have shown
that "children in families with incomes less than $15,000 per year are fortyfive times more likely to be victims of substantiated neglect than children
in families with incomes greater than $30,000 per year." 57 This
disproportionate involvement of poor families is due in part to a system that
153. KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS, supra note 128, at 16; see also KLEINER, REFORMING
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING, supra note 128, at 16.

154. Id.
155. Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in

the Child Protection System, 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 578 (1997) ("Nationwide, juvenile courts and child
protection agencies target hundreds of thousands of mothers who are disproportionately poor and of

color, even though child abuse and neglect is not confined to any social class or race."); Naomi R. Cahn,
Placing Children in Context: Parents, Foster Care and Poverty, in WHAT IS RIGHT FOR CHILDREN?:
THE COMPETING PARADIGMS OF RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 145, 150 (Martha Albertson Fineman

& Karen Worthington eds., 2009) ("Poor and African American families are disproportionately more
likely to be charged with child neglect."); Dorothy E. Roberts, Poverty, Race, and New Directions in
Child Welfare Policy, I WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 63, 64 (1999) ("[T]he public child welfare system in

America is populated almost exclusively by poor children.").
156. Jennifer Sykes, Negotiating Stigma: Understanding Mothers' Responses to Accusations of

Child Neglect, 33 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 448, 448 (2011). It is important to note that the child
welfare system also disproportionately involves black families. Indeed, black children make up more
than two-fifths of the children in foster care nationally, but less than one-fifth of the nation's children.
Dorothy Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 171, 172 (2003). Further, white
children who are abused or neglected were twice as likely as black children to receive services in their
own home (when the type and severity of alleged abuse or neglect were the same), rather than be placed
in foster care. Id. at 173. See also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. CHILDREN'S BUREAU,
RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY AND DISPARITY IN CHILD WELFARE (2016), https://www.childwelfare.

gov/pubPDFs/racial-disproportionality.pdf [http://perma.cc/NB33-YHYY]. I do not directly address
race in this Article, but race and poverty certainly interact in the context of the child welfare system, and
as Dorothy Roberts notes, stereotypes about black family dysfunction likely play a role in black
children's disproportionate involvement in the child welfare system. Child Welfare and Civil Rights,
supra, at 176. See also Appell, supra note 155, at 584. Documenting the interaction of poverty and race
in the child welfare system is beyond the scope of this Article, but an important undertaking, and one
Dorothy Roberts has done tremendously well. See Welfare and Civil Rights, supra; DOROTHY ROBERTS,
SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2002).

157. See Cahn, supra note 155, at 150.
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penalizes poverty conditions-children may be removed from their homes
(and their parent(s) charged with neglect) for poverty alone. For example,
one study in Illinois found that almost ten percent of children were removed
because of "environmental neglect," which was defined as a lack of
adequate food, shelter, or clothing, rather than any kind of deliberate action
on the part of the parent involved.' These are resource problems more than
neglect problems, and a clear example of the criminalization of poverty.
But resource problems alone do not fully explain the disproportionate
involvement of poor families in the child welfare system. Broad discretion
of social workers and bias against poor mothers are also likely contributing
factors.1 59 As Martin Guggenheim, 'a nationally recognized child welfare
law expert, New York University law professor, and co-director of New
York University Law School's Family Defense Clinic has articulated, child
neglect statutes tend to be extremely vague, thus giving extraordinary
discretion to the social workers involved. He said, "The reason we've
tolerated the level of impreciseness in these law for decades . . . is that they
tend to be employed almost exclusively in poor communitiescommunities that are already highly regulated and overseen by low-level
bureaucrats like the police." 6 0 Commentators have noted that an "offense"
committed by a poor parent in an area of high concentrated poverty is likely
to have a very different outcome than the same "offense" committed by a
parent in a high-income suburban neighborhood where child protective
services rarely frequent. As Scott Hechinger, a lawyer at the Brooklyn
Defender Services said, "[t]here's this judgment that these mothers don't
have the ability to make decisions about their kids, and in that, society both
infantilizes them and holds them to superhuman standards. In another
community, your kid's found outside looking for you because you're in the
bathtub, it's 'Oh, my God .. .. '161 But, he went on to say, "in a poor
62
community, it's called endangering the welfare of your child."'
The contrast can be striking. In one case that received national attention,
a mother who lived in Illinois, Natasha Felix, let her three sons, ages eleven,
nine, and five, play outside with a visiting young cousin in a fenced park
63
directly next to her apartment building.' The oldest son was charged with

158.

See id.

159. See Michelle Goldberg, Has Child Protective Services Gone Too Far?, THE NATION (Sept.
30, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/has-child-protective-services-gone-too-far/ [https://perma

.cc/LQ4W-TV4L].
160. Id.
161. Stephanie Clifford & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Foster Careas Punishment: The New Reality

of 'JaneCrow', N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/nyregion/foster-car
e-nyc-jane-crow.html [https://perma.cc/A53S-F2YY].
162. Id.
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watching the younger children, and Felix was watching out the window. At
one point the five-year-old got into an argument with his cousin over a
scooter and ended up running into the street. A preschool teacher who was
at the park saw this and called a child-abuse hotline, leading to a worker
from the Department of Children and Family Services visiting Felix and her
children. The investigator found that Felix's children were "clothed
appropriately, appeared clean [and] well groomed," and further that Felix
"appeared to be a good mother." " The worker also found that Felix's oldest
son seemed to be a "mature boy" who "certainly could be allowed to go
outside by himself to the park next door." 165
Ultimately, however, when the investigator found out that the elevenyear-old and nine-year-old had been diagnosed with ADHD, she
recommended that Felix be cited for "inadequate supervision" under the
Illinois Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act. Felix was placed on the
state's child-abuse registry, and placement on the registry led to Felix losing
her job as a home healthcare aide.' 66 Inclusion on this registry also meant
that Felix's goal to become a licensed practicing nurse would not be
achieved.1 6 7
A similar case involved a woman Maisha Joefield and her five-year-old
daughter Deja. Ms. Joefield's mother lived across the street, and Deja was
always told she could go to her grandmother's house in an emergency. One
night, after putting Deja to sleep, Ms. Joefield took a bath and put on
headphones. When Ms. Joefield got out of the bath, she could not find Deja,
who had woken up and headed to her grandmother's house. Ms. Joefield
started frantically searching for Deja, first in her apartment building, then
outside, and the police were called. Ms. Joefield was charged with
endangering the welfare of a child, and the Administration for Children's
Services in New York City put Deja in foster care. Ms. Joefield was
arrested, and after she was released from jail, Deja was returned to her four
days later. But her case stayed open for a year, and she had to take parenting
classes and subject herself to caseworkers regularly stopping by her house
to check her cupboards for adequate food, bruises on Deja's body, and
more. 168

Note that the Felix and Joefield cases both involved poor mothers. In
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. After over two years the charges were eventually dropped against Felix, but the damage
had already been done. Her job prospects during the two years the case was making its way through the
courts were extremely limited. Bonnie Miller Rubin, Child Neglect Citation DroppedAgainst Mother

Who Let Kids Play Outside, CHi. TRIB. (Dec. 16,2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ocallbrea
king/ct-child-neglect-citation-reversed-met-20151215-story.htmi.
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contrast, another case that was covered in international news was that of a
Maryland family, Alexander and Danielle Meitiv and their children. The
Meitivs were unusual in their involvement in the child welfare system
because Alexander was a theoretical physicist and Danielle was a science
writer and consultant-relatively prestigious and high-paid jobs. They also
lived in Silver Spring, Maryland, a wealthy suburb of Washington, DC.
The Meitivs described themselves as "free-range" parents, and they
allowed their two children, ages ten and six, to walk to a park by themselves.
The Meitivs were first warned by Child Protective Services, then, after a
second incident, a social worker said that they must sign a "temporary safety
plan" stating that their children would be supervised at all times, until Child
69
Protective Services could do a follow-up investigation.' Alexander Meitiv
refused to sign the plan, and as the Child Protective Services worker said
she would do, she called the police and had the children removed from their
parents. The Meitivs were originally found guilty of unsubstantiated child
neglect,"o but after hiring a lawyer to appeal these charges, they were
7
cleared of all child neglect after the agency "ruled out neglect."' ' Even
before the Meitivs hired a lawyer to appeal, however, note that they were
given several opportunities to avoid having their children removed from
72
their care, an option never given to Felix or Joefield.1
Not only do child welfare laws seem to be enforced at higher rates and
more aggressively in poor communities, but the realities of involvement in
the child welfare system disproportionately burden the poor, thus
contributing to legal immobility. Parents are often required to attend classes
such as parenting classes, anger management classes, nutrition classes, and
the like, and of course many of these classes are only held during the
workday. Since many low-wage jobs have unpredictable hours and do not
allow for consistent time off for these kinds of classes, poor parents are put
in a very tough spot. If they do not attend the classes, they risk either
extending the time their children are away from them or having their
children taken away. But if they do attend the class and ask for time off or
skip work, they risk losing their job. In some cases, taking the parenting
class is offered as an alternative to avoiding a criminal penalty for the child
neglect charge, and lack of attendance can mean a warrant and eventual
arrest for the parent. In turn, of course, time spent injail or an arrest on one's
record can result in job loss, difficulty obtaining a job in the future, and

169. Goldberg, supra note 160.
170. Id.
171. Jessica Chasmar, Free-rangeMeitiv Family Cleared of All Child-Neglect Allegations, WASH.
TIMES (June 22, 2015), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jun/22/free-range-meitiv-family-
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difficulty finding housing, among other things.
Classes are not the only time burden associated with involvement in the
child welfare system. Family court is notoriously slow, and simply going to
a hearing can take the entire day, often with the issue being extended
because someone is not in court, a service plan was not fully carried out by
a social worker, or because some other procedural complication arose. 173
More time in court means more time off from one's job, and more time off
can ultimately put a parent at risk of losing his or her job.
Finally, the disproportionate removal of poor children from their families
can have long-term negative effects for those children (and ultimately their
families). In several court cases in New York during the 1990s, biological
parents testified that when their children were returned from foster care,
they had to go directly to the hospital because they were so sick with
problems like skin rashes and black eyes.1 74 Seeming to confirm this
testimony, a study conducted by the New York City's Administration for
Children's Services found that the rate of physical abuse in foster care was
four times higher than abuse by parents in the city's toughest
neighborhoods. 7 7 Another study on the effect of foster care placement in
marginal cases (defined as cases where one investigator might put a child in
foster care but another might not) found that children tended to have better
outcomes if they remained at home. 7 6 11Children involved in these marginal
cases who were sent to foster care had, over time, higher delinquency rates,
higher teen birthrates, lower earnings, and a higher likelihood of going to
prison as an adult.1 77
E. Non-DrivingRelated License Suspensions
As highlighted in recent media accounts and in the Department of Justice
Ferguson report,'" 8 across the country people are having their drivers'
173. Martin Guggenheim, Parental Rights in Child Welfare Cases in New York City Family
Courts, 40 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 507, 508 (2007) [hereinafter Guggenheim, ParentalRights in
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www.nybooks.com/articles/2012/07/12/new-york-besieged-children/ [https://perma.cc/Z5NX-K86Q].
175. DAVID TOBIS, FROM PARIAHS TO PARTNERS: HOW PARENTS AND THEIR ALLIES CHANGED
NEW YORK CITY'S CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 185 (2013).
176. Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Child Protection and Child Outcomes: Measuringthe Effects ofFoster

Care, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1583, 1599-1607 (2007).
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., Radley Balko, The Criminalization of Poverty, WASH. POST (May 23, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/05/23/the-criminalization-of-poverty/

[http

s://perma.cc/8B3V-KW5F]; Editorial, Locked Up for Being Poor, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/201 7 /05/05/opinion/locked-up-for-being-poor.html
[https://perma.cc/M8R7-RU7
W]; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 62-80 (March 4,2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-release/atta

chments/2015/03/04/fergusonpolice department report.pdf [https://perma.cc/V74K-DPCR].
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licenses suspended as punishment for infractions that are unrelated to
driving, and often tied to poverty. This problem is a significant contributor
to legal immobility for those affected. Like many problems that contribute
to legal immobility through invisible localism, there is only limited
national-level data available to help us understand how widespread the
problem is. A study by the Government Accountability Office found that
while states collect data on license suspensions generally, they often do not
categorize suspensions by the type of offense or even as driving or nondriving related offenses.179 Further, even for states that do collect and
categorize such data, they do so in different ways so that it is hard to
compare the data. Finally, "states generally do not collect suspension data
for drivers by income level."so
However, the data that is available is enough to provide a sense of how
varying and widespread this practice is. The Brookings Institution recently
compiled information on fourteen different local communities and found
that "failure to pay a fine or appear in court [on charges unrelated to driving]
is almost always the number one cause of license suspension or
revocation."'"' Non-driving conditions that lead to license revocation are
widespread and variable: In Indianapolis, for example, they include failure
to pay child support, writing a bad check to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles,
and failure to attend school ("Indiana law requires school principals to
notify the DMV if a student under the age of eighteen is under an expulsion
or second suspension from school, has withdrawn from school . . ., or is a
habitual truant").182 In Iowa, public drunkenness with no car involved can
lead to a driver's license suspension; in Montana, drivers' licenses are
suspended for unpaid student loans, and in eight states (of fifteen studied by
the Brennan Center), drivers' license suspension is used to punish missed
criminal court debt payments.1 8 3
In New Jersey, non-driving-related license suspensions account for
eighty-three percent of drivers' license suspensions, child support issues for
three percent, and driving-related offenses for only eight percent of all
license suspensions.' 8 4 Another study of New Jersey license suspensions
179. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONG. REQUESTERS, LICENSE
SUSPENSIONS FOR NONDRIVING OFFENSES 19 (2010), https://www.gao.gov/assets/310/300910.pdf
[http://perma.cc/EQ74-7G37].
180. Id.
181. MARGY WALLER, JENNIFER DOLEAC & ILSA FLANAGAN, BROOKINGS INST., DRIVER'S
LICENSE SUSPENSION POLICIES 2 (2005), https://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/AECF-driverslicensesus

pensionpolicies-2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/VT65-WDK5].
182. Id. at 46.
183. EDELMAN, supra note 13, at 17.
184. SANDRA GUSTITUS, MELODY SIMMONS & MARGY WALLER, THE MOBILITY AGENDA,
ACCESS TO DRIVING AND LICENSE SUSPENSION POLICIES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ECONOMY
8 (2008), http://www.kidscount.org/news/fes/sep2008/driverslicense.pdf [https://perma.cc/L69G-L4
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found that "[t]he suspension rate was more than four times higher for drivers
residing in extremely low-income ZIP codes when compared to the rate
statewide," indicating that the problem might disproportionately affect poor
people.' 85

It is not hard to see how these varying laws all contribute to legal
immobility. In many communities, driving is often the only way people can
get to work, pick up their children in a timely fashion from daycare,
purchase affordable (or any) food for their families, and generally function.
If someone's license is suspended, a quick downward spiral of job loss (for
not showing up to work or not showing up on time) and all of the negative
externalities of job loss can quickly occur. Cars are also what allow many
parents to adequately care for their children, and a lack of access to a car
can mean missed doctors' appointments, inability to purchase necessities,
inability to pick up and drop off to child care settings, and the like. Indeed,
some of these problems can trigger involvement from the child welfare
system-the scenarios can continue, and more and more aspects of
invisible, local, legal immobility can cumulatively affect the person in
question.
F. Driving-RelatedLaws
A recent study that tracked American drivers with a cellular phone app
found that thirty-six percent of all drives those in the study undertook
involved speeding.' Since drivers knew they were being tracked, the
incidence of speeding is probably even higher for the average American.
Yet the consequences for driving above the speed limit can vary widely state
by state. In some states, if one cannot afford to hire a lawyer or does not
know to do so, the consequences of a speeding ticket can be profound.
In North Carolina, for example, the relevant section of the North
Carolina Code is Section 20-16.1, entitled: Mandatory suspension of
driver's license upon conviction of excessive speeding; limited driving
permits for first offenders.1 87 This law has the potential to be a significant
factor in limiting upward mobility for unsuspecting poor drivers. The North
Carolina Code dictates that if a driver is caught speeding fifteen miles per
hour over the posted speed limit (and is going over fifty-five miles per hour),
his license will be suspended for thirty days. Or, if a driver is going over
FG].
185. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 179, at 14. Because of a lack of income

data collected, the researcher could not precisely match suspensions to suspended drivers, and thus
examined the suspension rates by income levels of zip codes. Id.
186. EVERDRIVE SAFE DRIVING REPORT 2016-2017 (2017), https://www.everquote.com/everdriv

e/safe-driving-report-2016/ [https://perma.cc/BA9P-SXLD].
187. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.1 (2017).
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eighty miles per hour (at any speed over), his license will be suspended for
thirty days. A second offense within a calendar year means a sixty-day
suspension.' 88

A simple Google search of "getting a speeding ticket in North Carolina"
reveals dozens of lawyers advertising their services to help secure a
reduction in offense for people caught speeding (usually to a non-moving
violation or a Prayer for Judgment).18 9 These lawyers' websites document
the negative consequences on one's car insurance rate if no reduction is
given and attempt to highlight why a lawyer is needed. 190 For those who
either cannot afford a lawyer or do not know to hire one, however, accepting
a speeding ticket without a reduction in offense can mean negative financial
consequences. Not only might their license be suspended, as discussed
above, but also their insurance rates may increase. And if the original
offender decides to keep driving after his or her license is suspended (studies
show that seventy-five percent of people whose licenses are suspended do
indeed keep driving because they have to get to work, school, or a doctor's
appointment), the potential consequences are even more severe, with
incarceration a possibility.' 9' For most people living paycheck to paycheck,
simply hiring an Uber or taxi to get them where they want to go is not a
financial option, so they are left making difficult choices.
Finally, in almost all states, not just those with particularly harsh license
revocation laws for speeding, the consequence of not paying a speeding
ticket by the due date or not appearing in court for a ticket can be severe,
with a cascade of other consequences to follow. And, of course, for people
who are poor, they simply may not have the money it takes to pay off a
speeding ticket immediately.1 9 2
Similar to other components of legal immobility, the actual speeding
ticket in and of itself appears to be a minor burden. But for the poor, the
speeding ticket can trigger a cascade of negative events because they cannot
afford to pay or fight it, reaching as far as job loss (if their license is
suspended and they cannot get to work) and even jail, if they do not pay the
fines and fees associated with the ticket. Jail of course can lead to job loss,
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., Raleigh Traffic Ticket Attorney, http://www.nclawtalk.com [https://perma.cc/D9R

4-24HK]; Traffic Attorneys in North Carolina, https://www.iticket.law/ [https://perma.cc/5SJM-XN7J];
3 Things to Do After You Get a Speeding Ticket in North Carolina, http://www.helpingpeoplenc.com/
3-things-to-do-after-you-get-a-speeding-ticket-in-north-carolina/ [https://perma.cc/GZ5E-HUV4].
190. See, e.g., id.
191. EDELMAN, supra note 13, at 14-17.
192. See, e.g., Sara Dorn, Cleveland Mother's Unpaid Traffic Ticket Led to Suspended License,
Jail, Court Fines, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 31, 2017) (describing the cascade of consequences a mother

experienced when she did not pay a traffic related ticket because she could not afford to do so),
https://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2017/03/indigent_cleveland-Mothers-unp.html

ma.cc/ZW39-HCPY].
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involvement of the child welfare system, and a host of other situations
which make upward mobility a far-off dream.
G. UnderstandingCumulative Effects and Legal Immobility: A
Theoretical Case Study
Each of the laws and rules discussed above contributes to legal
immobility, but the list is by no means comprehensive. The examples above,
collectively, are meant to highlight how diverse the areas of law are that
disproportionately burden the poor and how in many cases this burden can
be mostly invisible. Often the laws that contribute to legal immobility are
local and, on their face, they do not obviously disproportionately burden the
poor. Indeed, some of the laws seem quite rational-it is only when one digs
deeper that it becomes apparent that the laws are particularly burdensome
to the poor. Further, taken alone the burden of some of the individual laws
is tough, but may not on its own profoundly limit upward mobility.
However, the cumulative nature of the laws, and the way they can build on
each other, can make upward mobility for those living in poverty a distant
dream--thus, the concept of legal immobility.
Take Joanne,1 93 who I discussed above in the context of the cumulative
effects of various health problems. Now, replace those health problems and
instead consider how the cumulative effects of various local and state laws
could work together to make it difficult for Joanne to achieve upward
mobility. Imagine Joanne as a single mother of two young children. She is
renting an apartment in a small city in the south and has recently started
working as a manager at the fast food restaurant. Before becoming a
manager, she had been a cash register attendant for the previous six months,
but she worked her way up.
Joanne's upstairs neighbors are constantly involved in obvious drug
deals, and Joanne fears for the safety of her children. Particularly since
Joanne often arrives at home after dark, once her shift has ended and she
has picked up her children from the local daycare (that accepts child care
vouchers), she decides to take action. She starts calling the police to report
these crimes, and she has decided that she will call every time she witnesses
a suspicious looking transaction. The city in which Joanne lives has a strong
nuisance ordinance, and the police get tired of responding to her calls by
sending a trooper out to investigate, especially since the drug transaction is
193. Joanne is a fictional depiction of a poor mother. However, her story is an overall composite
of stories told to me by poor mothers I interviewed for several other research studies. See generally
Greene, supra note 78; Sara Sternberg Greene, The Bootstrap Trap, 67 DUKE L.J. 233 (2017); Kathryn
Edin et al., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SNAP FOOD SECURITY IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW STUDY FINAL REPORT

(2013), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/SNAPFoodSec.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9MC-F
3XS].
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usually long over by the time the trooper arrives at the apartment building.
Joanne is not aware of the nuisance ordinance or how it works, and thus she
does not know that she is at risk for her apartment being deemed a nuisance.
The police do not warn her, but instead they issue a warning to her landlord.
Her landlord does not want to risk a hefty fine, so he wants to get Joanne
out and replace her with a less burdensome (in his eyes) tenant. So, he tells
Joanne that once her lease is up in two months, her rent will increase by
forty-five percent, something Joanne simply cannot afford. Thus, she has
about sixty days to find a new apartment and move.
Joanne begs and pleads with her landlord to change his mind, but he will
not budge. She looks for another affordable apartment, but on such a short
timetable and with a very limited supply of affordable housing in her city,
the only apartment she finds that is reasonable for herself and her children
is another thirty minutes away from her job and beloved daycare. She signs
the lease for the new apartment, but the move stretches her finances thinshe must put down a new security deposit before getting her old one back
and also pay the first month's rent. In order to cover these expenses in cash,
she must use the income she usually spends on food and other basics. So
she then must turn to credit cards to cover these everyday expenses. Further,
moving costs are burdensome even though she tries to do as much herself
as she can, and she realizes that there are several goods she has to buy-a
microwave, for example, since her old apartment had one built in, as well
as a washer and dryer since there is no laundromat close to the new
apartment. She spends $600 on these assorted goods (all using credit cards),
and since she lives in a southern state, the sales tax is disproportionately
high and adds even more to these already steep prices.
Perhaps most burdensome to Joanne in the long term is her new fortyminute commute to work and daycare-her old commute was roughly ten
minutes. As Joanne attempted to get her children on a new sleeping
schedule, in the beginning they were often running late in the morning. One
day while speeding in order to drop off her children and make it to work on
time, she was stopped by a police officer. She was going seventy-six in a
sixty-miles-per-hour speed zone-in her state, this meant automatic license
suspension since it was fifteen miles per hour over the speed limit and she
was going over fifty-five miles per hour. Not only did Joanne face automatic
suspension of her license, but she also faced hundreds of dollars in fees and
fines-money that had to be paid if she ever hoped to reinstate her license.
At this point, the situation could go in different directions. In some
scenarios, Joanne may decide to drive without a license in order to keep her
job and childcare situation, but the risks would be significant. Or, Joanne
could consider looking for a job closer to her new home in order to be able
to walk to work. She would of course also have to find a new childcare
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situation that was both affordable and nearby. Assume she pursued this path
and learned that the only nearby businesses that seemed to be hiring were a
few hair salons. Joanne does research about becoming a hair stylist. The
more research she does, however, the more frustrated she becomes because
she realizes that she cannot simply "become a hairstylist." She would have
to invest money and time in schooling and apprenticeships-money and
time she simply does not have. It would take her almost a year to become a
licensed hair stylist, and meanwhile, her family would have no way of
staying financially afloat.
Other laws could hit Joanne. A new neighbor who does not like the noise
her children bring to the building could report Joanne to the child welfare
department, a fairly common occurrence. But even without these added
issues, the cumulative effects of the nuisance laws, driving laws, state and
local tax laws, and occupational licensing laws, together, make Joanne's
situation dire. Taken cumulatively, these seemingly trivial laws allowed us
to see legal immobility at work. Joanne had been thriving: her children were
in a quality daycare she was comfortable with, and she had recently been
named a manager at the restaurant where she worked. But by simply doing
what she believed a good citizen would do-reporting criminal activity in
her building-one thing led to another and Joanne ended up in debt and
unsure what her next move would be. She, having just received a promotion
at work, had been on a path toward upward mobility. But the cumulative
effects of state and local laws kept her immobile, even potentially leading
to downward mobility.
III. TRIPARTITE THEORY OF LEGAL IMMOBILITY

The purpose of this three-prong theory of legal immobility is to explore
the root causes of the components behind legal immobility. Such an analysis
is important if the goal is to increase the chances of upward class mobility
for the poor. If legal immobility is a significant mechanism through which
mobility is prevented, and we want to develop a plan to overcome some of
the obstacles it presents, then we first have to understand how and why the
laws that contribute to legal immobility exist. It is only then that we can
begin to develop a blueprint for overcoming the barriers that legal
immobility present for the poor. As the tripartite theory suggests, there are
three key pathways through which laws that combine to create legal
immobility generally function. In this Part, I describe each pathway and
provide an example, with historical context, of laws that fit into each prong
of the theory.

2019]

A THEORY OF POVERTY

789

A. CalculatedExploitation
Through calculated exploitation, localities and states are intentionally
exploiting the poor in order to fund government activities and satisfy more
powerful interest groups. This does not mean that there is a malicious intent
in functioning this way; rather, localities find that the only politically viable
way of raising revenue to support and improve public services is by enacting
laws that disproportionately burden the poor. In analyzing the history of
state and local taxation, Katherine Newman and Rourke O'Brien found that
this is indeed what happened in southern regions of the country and
increasingly in the Pacific Northwest.' 9 4 They argued that regional
disparities in state and local taxes in the southern states date back to
Reconstruction. The needs of the poor skyrocketed after the Civil War
ended, and newly formed state legislatures had to find a way to fund the
needs of indigent blacks and whites. 195 The legislatures, consisting primarily
of Southern Republicans, drastically increased property taxes on defeated
white landowners and former slave owners in order to fund services aimed
at addressing the needs of indigents-the first public services such as
96
education, hospitals, and roads for black citizens.' Indeed, "property taxes
97
increased four- to eight-fold in the Reconstruction period."' Few poor
98
blacks or whites owned property, and rich landowners were furious.1
However, when Reconstruction ended in 1877, conservative Democrats
(the "Redeemers") quickly worked to bring taxes back to their prewar
levels.1 99 As federal troops pulled out of the South and the Jim Crow regime
ruled, the former power structures of the South reappeared, and with these
changes came the end of progressive tax policies that had jump started social
and structural change in the South.2 00 White politicians dominated southern
legislatures by the late 1870s, and state budgets were slashed as taxes were
cut. Property taxes declined precipitously-the tax codes of most Southern
states once again gave property preferential treatment, protecting white
elites.20' Historian C. Vann Woodward wrote, "redemption governments,
often describing themselves as the 'rule of the taxpayer,' frankly constituted
194. NEWMAN & O'BRIEN, supra note 74, at 1-30. As Ezra Rosser has pointed out, the recognition
that we need to frame poverty as a matter of exploitation was a significant contribution of Matthew

Desmond's book Evicted, discussed in supra Part 1. See Rosser, supra note 45, at 459 ("As Desmond
rightly points out, we do not generally frame poverty as a matter of exploitation and doing so forces the
reader to confront a series of uncomfortable questions.").
195. NEWMAN & O'BRIEN, supra note 74, at 8.
196. Newman, supra note 93.
197. NEWMAN & O'BRIEN, supra note 74, at 8.

198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
Id. at 9-10.
Id.
Id. at 10.
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themselves champions of the property owner against the property less and
allegedly untaxed masses."202 A Congressman wrote in a local newspaper,
"Intelligence and property must rule over imbecility and pauperism [for this
is the] law alike of nature and society." 2 03
Redeemers wanted to make sure the changes they were making stuck,
and so they sought to insert supermajority clauses into state constitutions to
ensure that tax increases of the kind that happened during Reconstruction
would not happen again .20 "Property taxes were frozen, income taxes were
held down, and corporate taxes were almost nonexistent." 2 05
In states that had not created constitutional barriers to increased property
taxation, racially inspired voting rights restrictions meant the people most
likely to favor increases in property taxes could not vote. 20 6 These states
found that sales taxes seemed like the ideal solution to solve budget
problems they were having because sales taxes were a way to extract taxes
out of poor whites and African Americans who paid little if any property
taxes, and it did not hurt property owners, who did not want their tax burden
to increase. 2 07
Mississippi was the first state to adopt a general sales tax, of two percent,
and when it was adopted in 1932 a headline in a local paper read, "House
Passes Bill to Insure Relief for Property Tax Payers."20 8 Several other
Southern states followed suit, and bitter class (and race) commentary
followed. One newspaper published an Op-Ed that read in part, "The rich
man, the large real estate owner ... now wants the average man to pay his
(the rich man's) taxes when he buys his sugar and coffee and shoes and
coal." 2 09
Post-World War II, Southern states continued on this trajectory:
corporate taxes were slashed, property taxes continued to be low, and sales
taxes continued to grow. 2 10 During the Civil Rights era, the technique of the
Redemption era of creating constitutional spending limits and supermajority
rules resurfaced, and Florida, Louisiana, Virginia, North Carolina, and
South Carolina all introduced constitutional limitations on property taxes
and expenditures in the 1960s and 1970s.2 1 1
Because the supermajority clauses in the state Constitutions prevented
202. NEWMAN & O'BRIEN, supra note 74, at 10 (quoting C.V. WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW

SourH, 1877-1913 59 (1971)).
203. Id.
204. NEWMAN & O'BRIEN, supra note 74, at 13; Newman, supra note 93.

205. Newman, supra note 93.
206. NEWMAN & O'BRIEN, supra note 74, at 37.

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
Id. at 22.
See id.
Id. at 25-29.
Id. at 22.
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any other increase in revenue, and states had to fund public services
somehow-an increased sales tax became the answer. 2 12 The pattern
repeated itself in other states outside of the South.2 13 For example, after
California passed Proposition 13 in 1978, an amendment to the California
Constitution that capped property-tax increases, the state sales tax
increased.2 14 There are various explanations and arguments about the
origins of Proposition 13;215 one well-known theory fits squarely within the
calculated exploitation theory, as discussed below.
In 1971, seven years before Proposition 13 was passed, the California
Supreme Court issued a school finance equalization decision in Serrano v.
216
In the Serrano case, the key issue was California's reliance on the
Priest.
local property tax system as the primary source of funding local public
schools. The plaintiffs in Serrano argued that interjurisdictional disparities
in property wealth meant unconstitutional inequality in per pupil
expenditure levels.2 17 The California Supreme Court agreed with the
plaintiffs and ordered the state legislature to change the system; the remedy
was supposed to equalize per pupil expenditure levels and "recapture" a
portion of high-spending districts' property wealth for redistribution to lowwealth jurisdictions. 218
Scholars argue that before Serrano, wealthy local voters embraced the
property tax. However, after the ruling, the incentives for wealthy
homeowners were different. 219 They did not want their property taxes
distributed to low-wealth districts in order to improve those schools (rather
than going to the schools in their district to keep them "good"), and thus,
voters in wealthy districts supported the Jarvis-Gann campaign for
Proposition 13 .220 Related to this first argument, there was also pressure at
the legislative level to relieve property tax rates as property values began to
212. Newman, supra note 93.

213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., Kirk Stark & Jonathan Zasloff, Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did Serrano Really Cause

Proposition 13?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 801 (2003).
216. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
217. Id. at 1242.
218. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES INFLUENCE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 98-128 (2001); PETER
SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST: CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE, AMERICA'S FUTURE 148-49 (1998); William A.

Fischel, Did Serrano Cause Proposition 13?, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 465 (1989); William A. Fischel,
Homevoters, Municipal CorporateGovernance, and the Benefit View of the Property Tax, 54 NAT'L

TAX J. 157, 168 (2001) ("1 believe that Serrano caused Proposition 13."); William A. Fischel, How
Serrano Caused Proposition 13, 12 J.L. & POL. 607 (1996).
219. See supra note 218.
220. It is important to note that some more recent academic work argues that this line of reasoning

is flawed. See, e.g., Kirk Stark & Jonathan Zasloff, supra note 215, at 804,853 ("Our analysis has shown,
we believe, that there is little empirical foundation for Fischel's claim that Serrano caused Proposition
13.").
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rise in the early 1970s (and thus taxes rose). 2 2 1However, the argument goes,
the expected costs of Serrano compliance made the state legislature
effectively unable to respond to these political pressures. 22 2 Essentially, "by
constitutionally mandating school finance equalization, the California
Supreme Court prevented the political system from satisfying the tax relief
preferences of wealthy (and thus influential) homeowners."223
So as the federal government pulled back funding for social services and
public services starting in the Nixon era, continuing to the Gingrich
Congress of the 1990s, state and local governments in California had to do
something to raise revenue, both to provide social and public services and
to meet federal matching requirements.2 24 Increasing the sales tax was one
of the most politically viable options, and this is what California did. 225
Other Western states followed in California's footsteps, constitutionally
limiting property taxes and then increasing the state sales tax.226
Ultimately, throughout history, state legislatures found themselves in
binds: they needed revenue, but powerful and wealthy landowner
constituents did not want their property taxes used to fund social and public
services. So, the legislatures did what was politically feasible and in the
course of doing so engaged in calculated exploitation: they increased taxes
that the wealthy did not have such a large stake in, at the expense of poor
citizens who had little political power to protest.
B. GratuitousManagement
In other cases, states and localities are engaging in what I call gratuitous
management, where they use the law as a means to regulate and manage the
poor. The child welfare system is one such example. The power held by the
state in child welfare cases is extraordinary: the government can remove
children from their parents' custody and can even terminate parental rights
completely and forever. 22 7 The threat of this extraordinary power has
resulted in a system that is used as a means of social control. David Tobis,
a child welfare expert, wrote:
The pervasiveness of these investigations and the resultant child
removals have created a widespread and profound fear in inner-city
neighborhoods. As. .. impoverished parents repeatedlyjump through

221. Id. at 804.
222. Id. at 804.
223. Id. at 809.
224. NEWMAN & O'BRIEN, supra note 74, at 49

225. Id. at 49-50.
226. Id.
227. MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S RiGHTS 176 (2005).
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hoops to keep their children or to have their children returned to them,
they become fearful, preoccupied, and compliant. This is exactly
what a child welfare system focused on social control seeks to
accomplish. 228

'

The government, however, did not always play an active role in child
welfare. For the most part, save for a few private associations, few entities,
governmental or otherwise, were paying attention to children's well-being
before the 1930s. 2 29 The period between the 1930s and the 1970s was one
during which most of the focus on child-wellbeing focused on providing
families with aid through cash benefits, such as Social Security and Aid to
Dependent Children (ADC). 23 0 Child abuse and neglect were not issues
thought to be a serious threat to children, and the principle of parental rights
(freedom to raise children in the home free from government intervention)
as well as a sense that children were generally safe in their homes were
prevalent.2 3
However, in the 1960s, there was a transformation. Just as doctor groups
began to draw attention to injuries they saw children sustain in their homes,
and the children's rights movement grew, so too did President Johnson's
War on Poverty, which by 1967 linked child welfare and poverty within the
2 32
But when
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program.
Richard Nixon took over as President in 1968, many of the poverty-centered
programs of Johnson's War on Poverty and Great Society came under
attack, and public perception was that money spent on liberal anti-poverty
programs might actually have been making the problems of the poor
worse. 2 33 Supporters of the War on Poverty thus had to try to find a way to
2 34
secure bipartisan support for government spending on poor families. Led
by Senator Walter Mondale, the new strategy focused on child abuse,
neglect, and protection, arguing that child abuse was a "national" problem
2 35
rather than a "poverty problem" in order to gain support for his proposal.
In 1974 Congress passed The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
(CAPTA), 2 36 with support from a bipartisan group of politicians based on
228. TOBIS, supra note 175, at xxy.
229. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 227, at 181-82; TOBIS, supra note 175, at 1-2 ("The contemporary
child welfare system in the United States began in 1935 when the federal government began to fund and
regulate child welfare through the Social Security Act."). One exception to this was child labor
protection laws, which were enacted at the federal level before the 1930s. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 227,
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the claim that child abuse and neglect is a problem for all children, not just
poor children. 2 37
This new orientation served to alter the child welfare system toward one
of social control. Instead of a system that recognized the role poverty played
in the need for child welfare services, child abuse and neglect came to be
seen as a defect and failure of individual parents. 238 It was no longer
considered a social problem related to poverty that required state help to
alleviate the core of the problem: poverty.239 Thus, as Martin Guggenheim
said, "Any suggestion of broad systemic solutions that address poverty
issues has been banned from the child welfare debate." 24 0
The child welfare system transformed itself into a system that lawyers
who work within the system suggest is used to surveil and "punish parents
who have few resources." 241 Parents regard the system as one that controls
their lives and sets needless obstacles in their path-it is perceived as a
police power.24 2 Mothers involved in the system often "go through the
motions" of service plans instituted by child welfare services in order to
keep their families together, but they do not view service plans as a useful
tool to help improve behavior caseworkers see as problematic. 243 Indeed, as
experts have argued, the child welfare system is often used as a means of
socialization, social control, and a way to regulate the behavior of
potentially disruptive poor families.244
Advocates who work within the child welfare system note that the
system is particularly reactive to systemic failures-extreme cases, reported
in the news media, where children were being monitored by the system, left
with their parents, and then were killed or found severely abused or
neglected.245 In these extreme cases and others where parents are abusing
(and in some cases neglecting) their children in dangerous ways, the state
of course must intervene to protect the children. But often, these extreme
237. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 227, at 184-85.
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generally Sykes, supra note 156.
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cases result in a crackdown of all cases, particularly in poor neighborhoods
with a disproportionate child protective services presence. Reorganization
often takes place after such extreme incidents, new personnel take the lead,
and the system becomes even more careful and risk-adverse, often to the
detriment of involved parents and children. 2 4 6 Parents are asked to go
through many hoops and answer to many state authorities in order to either
get their children back from foster care or to keep their families together.
They are entered into registries of child abusers, and they find themselves
tracked, labeled, controlled, and managed.247
C. Routine Neglect
Finally, in some cases, states are engaging in routine neglect-the poor
are an afterthought, essentially forgotten as the status quo reigns and
systematically makes mobility a distant dream to the least powerful.
Occupational licensing is such a case. As the number of occupations that
require licensing has increased, the effects of these measures on the poor
have, for the most part, been ignored. Generally, the discussion centers
around how the licensing of a profession may affect consumers (as a whole),
versus the occupation's practitioners.
There are several explanations for the increase in licensing. A White
House study found that one explanation lies in industry representatives
believing that professionalizing their industry has benefits, and licensing is
part of this professionalization equation. 2 ' Generally, licensing is thought
to benefit professions because it can help the profession gain greater
legitimacy, cultural authority, and income.2 49 Further, well-established
practitioners of a certain trade or industry sometimes advocate for licensing
in order to reduce the number of competitors in their industry/trade. This
often allows existing practitioners to charge higher prices for their services
and to ensure that they maintain their business.2 50 Relatedly, licensing has
also gained support from those within industries because of the idea that
licensing can increase consumer confidence about the quality of a service,
2 52
thus increasing demand. 251 Further, despite evidence to the contrary,
advocates for licensing generally argue that a specific licensing requirement
246. Id.
247. Sykes, supra note 156, at 449.
248. OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 133, at 21-22.
249. Paul Starr, Professionalization and Public Health: Historical Legacies, Continuing
Dilemmas, 15 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. PRACTICE S26 (2009); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982).
250. Simon Rottenberg, The Economics ofOccupationalLicensing, 13-19, in ASPECTS OF LABOR
ECONOMICS (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962).
251. OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 133, at 22.
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would also benefit society at large because it would improve quality and
public safety by regulating the field.2 53 However, on the other side,
consumer groups have argued that licensing reduces competition and thus
increases prices for consumers.2 54
Producer/industry groups are also thought to be more politically
influential than consumer groups.25 5 Thus, strong advocacy groups for a
given occupation are usually able to push through licensing legislation, even
if there is some consumer group advocacy against the provision.2 56 Some
research evens "suggests that a licensed professions' degree of political
influence is one of the most important factors in determining whether
[s]tates regulate an occupation." 257 Ultimately, passing licensing legislation
tends to be easy, especially with the help of advocacy groups, because
licensing boards tend to be revenue neutral (and some are revenue
generating). 258 The boards tend to be funded by the fees charged, and thus
politicians do not have to consider the need for additional funding when
they vote on the creation of a licensing requirement.25 9
In the case of occupational licenses, neither industry leaders nor
legislatures seem to be targeting the poor when making rules about
licensing. Instead, the interests of those in power dominate with little regard
for the consequence of these actions on the poor, as discussed in Part II.C.
Indeed, the poor are mostly forgotten. Here, governments are engaging in
routine neglect.
IV. PRELIMINARY IMPLICATIONS FOR POVERTY POLICY

As noted above, the goal of this Article is not to argue that legal
immobility is the cause of persistent poverty or to argue that the many other
explanations of persistent poverty are incorrect. Indeed, much more work is
needed to understand the relative role of legal immobility in perpetuating
poverty and immobility. However, in this section I briefly sketch where
legal and policy changes may be needed if we accept that the law is a
significant factor in limiting upward mobility and trapping the poor in
poverty. At present, few anti-poverty programs, if any, focus on changes in
local and state law as a potential avenue for helping the poor. Instead, most
programs are aimed at providing aid in the form of cash, shelter, and food.
But if we accept legal immobility as a reality, the implication is that we
253. OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 133, at 21-22.
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will not be able to make significant headway in increasing long-term
upward mobility without tackling the problems of legal immobility. And if
we accept that legal immobility does not stem from one single policy or law,
the problem becomes even more complicated. Legal immobility cannot
simply be solved through one common legal or policy shift. This is part of
what separates legal immobility from the problem of localities using their
criminal justice system as for-profit enterprises at the expense of the poor.
In the case of Ferguson, there was evidence from internal emails that the
head of finance directed, explicitly, that when it came to policing, revenue
maximization, rather than public safety, should be the goal.260 Local judges
imposed penalties such as $302 for jaywalking and $531 for allowing weeds
to grow in one's yard. 261' The judge then issued warrants for the residents
who did not make these payments on time. 26 2 These arrests then resulted in
"new charges, more fees, and the suspension of drivers' licenses."26 3
There, the key was uncovering these practices. The Justice Department
took swift action by relying on basic Constitutional principles that do not
allow the government to imprison a person for nonpayment without
considering whether the person can pay. 2 " The Department released
guidance to state and local governments clarifying rules about criminal
justice court fees, and also created grant programs and provided other
financial resources to drive change and reverse the trend of what amounted
to debtor's prisons across the country.26 5
A similar technique might work in cases where local and state laws are
contributing to legal immobility through calculated exploitation. In such
cases, federal responses with legal direction might invoke change. But in
the case of Ferguson, there were potential Constitutional violations that
provoked guidance and change. In the case of disproportionate tax burdens
on the poor, for example, even though rooted in calculated exploitation,
there do not seem to be Constitutional violations in play that would provoke
change.
In some cases of gratuitous management, legal challenges may be
warranted, and like the case of debtors' prisons, uncovering the local and
state practices where gratuitous management is present may be the first step
260. Chiraag Bains, Sessions Says to Courts: Go Ahead, JailPeople Because They're Poor, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/opinion/sessions-says-to-courts-go-ahea

d-jail-people-because-theyre-poor.html.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. Recently, the Department of Justice, under the direction of Attorney General Jeff
Sessions, has rolled back this guidance. However, despite this rollback, advocates argue that the practice
of debtors' prisons is unconstitutional and the guidance is needed. Id.
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toward action. But in many cases of both gratuitous management and
routine neglect, it is unlikely there are clear practices that warrant legal
challenges, again making a debtors' prison type approach difficult.
So what might be done? If the goal is to create legal and policy changes
that promote upward mobility, the first step may very well be bringing
attention to the role that state and local law can play in thwarting mobility.
The law is often thought of as a tool to potentially help the poor gain rights,
but it is not generally conceptualized as something that in and of itself may
be perpetuating poverty. Indeed, the goal of this Article is to draw attention
to this phenomenon. But that is where the real work begins. Particularly in
cases of routine neglect, simply drawing attention the legal structures that
lead to barriers for upward mobility might begin to promote change. But
even more could be done. The federal government might consider ways to
incentivize states to consider how various laws and policies may unduly
burden the poor, and states may too consider ways to incentivize localities
to do the same. Anti-poverty programs are sometimes very expensive; those
programs are needed. But reducing poverty by limiting or changing laws
that promote legal immobility may be a relatively inexpensive way to make
some headway in the fight against poverty. Recognizing this reality may
promote change at the state and local level.
Another area of focus may be in the delivery of legal services to the poor.
As it stands now, due to funding limitations, half of Americans who request
help from Legal Aid Organizations will be turned away. 266 In cases where
legal services might help limit legal immobility, the limited supply of
lawyers available to the poor make the potential for legal intervention that
much lower.
Further, legal service organizations that receive funding from the
federally funded Legal Services Corporation (LSC) are restricted from a
wide range of advocacy and litigation, including any attempt to influence
rulemaking or lawmaking, participating in class actions, and requesting
attorney's fees under applicable statutes, among several others. 2 67 But if
there are laws contributing to legal immobility that deserve challenge, we
need more capacity for such challenges by lawyers who are both focused on
these issues and see the issues in their everyday work, as they provide
services to the very clients affected by the laws that contribute to legal
immobility.
Since most legal service organizations cannot do such advocacy, we need
to consider other pathways for such identification and work. Certainly, the
266. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, 2017 JUSTICE GAP REPORT, https://www.1sc.gov/media-ce
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work of the Department of Justice was notable and fueled change in the case
of Ferguson, but the pathways that led to the involvement of the Justice
Department in the Ferguson investigation are a relative anomaly and more
thought must be taken to develop ways of uncovering other violations
without deep federal investigations. Perhaps informal partnerships could be
formed between LSC funded organizations that cannot engage in advocacy
work and other organizations that can. Legal aid organizations could work
with these advocacy programs to identify issues and laws that lead to legal
immobility, while not doing the advocacy and class action work themselves.
Ultimately, much more work is needed to understand the normative and
policy claims that should be made in light of the legal immobility theory.
As the concept of legal immobility is disseminated, discussed, and
improved, I expect further and more detailed claims about how to integrate
the details of legal immobility into poverty policy and law to follow.
CONCLUSION

The cumulative effects of state and local law can play an important role
in perpetuating poverty. Conceptualizing state and local laws as
cumulatively disadvantageous to the poor, however, is a surprisingly
neglected topic among legal scholars and scholars of poverty. Some
scholars of law or poverty have identified individual areas of state and local
laws that disproportionately burden the poor,268 but few have moved beyond
the individual silos of one particular burden to consider how these often
hidden burdens embedded within the law might, as a whole, systematically
play a significant role in perpetuating poverty and thwarting upward
mobility.
Thus, while we have accounts of how individual laws disadvantage the
poor, little thought has been devoted to considering how these laws,
considered together, might be a significant factor in limiting upward
mobility. Indeed, we do not even have a vocabulary for describing the role
of the law in this way, nor a robust account of the range of laws that
disadvantage the poor, how it happens, and what the implications are for the
study of law and poverty.
This Article reflects a first step in identifying the concept of legal
immobility. It begins by pinpointing the types of laws that are often
burdensome to the poor: they are often local in nature (and thus not easily
tracked) and often seemingly invisible-on their face, these laws do not
appear to have a disproportionately adverse impact on the poor. The Article
then proceeds to take examples from several different fields of law and
268. See supra notes 10, 13.
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describes how various state and local laws put a particular burden on the
poor. After detailing these examples, the Article asks the reader to consider
the following analogy: just as the cumulative effects of several ailments and
diseases can wreak havoc on the human body, we can imagine the state and
local laws that burden the poor in seemingly small ways as diseases and
ailments that cumulatively take a toll. After leading the reader through this
analogy, I identify a three-prong approach to understanding the historical
roots of laws that have an invisible burden on the poor, and how these laws
continue to function. Finally, I discuss the implications of legal immobility
and this tripartite theory for poverty law more generally.
There is no doubt that the account of legal immobility offered in this
Article is oversimplified in order to introduce the concept in a meaningful
and clear way. There is work to be done on both an empirical and theoretical
level in order to develop a more nuanced account of legal immobility.
Further empirical work is needed to understand how exactly the cumulative
nature of burdensome laws works; work could also be done to determine a
scale measuring the relative burden of various laws as income declines.
Additionally, empirical projects could seek to compare different localities
by measuring laws across several fields and their relative burden on the
poor, and then control for other factors while measuring outcomes for poor
families living within these various localities. Ethnographic case studies
focusing on specific localities or specific laws would also add a more
nuanced perspective on the mechanisms through which legal immobility
functions.
There is also more work to be done to better understand the breadth of
legal immobility. We need to pinpoint as many areas of state and local law
that might contribute to legal immobility as possible, and further analysis
could also shed light on the role of federal law in contributing to legal
immobility. For example, the federal bankruptcy laws might be one fruitful
area for further study. Further, while I do not discuss the intersectionality of
class, race, and gender in this Article, much more work must be done to
understand how legal immobility may disproportionately affect women and
racial and ethnic minorities living in poverty. Empirical studies could
directly compare the varying effects of legal immobility on different
demographic groups.
This Article also provokes important normative work on several
questions that I only begin to tackle in this Article: (1) whether (and how)
states and localities should consider legal immobility when they are
invoking new laws and altering old ones; and (2) whether there should be
any federal response to local and state laws that contribute to legal
immobility, and what these responses might be (including any potential
legal challenges).
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Ultimately, this Article is meant to move the conversation about poverty
law in the direction of better understanding how law functions to perpetuate
and exacerbate poverty using the concept of legal immobility as a guide,
providing a new direction for research and discourse. It highlights the need
to view the law as a structure that is inhibiting upward class mobility for the
poor. As the poor work toward upward mobility, they encounter barriers
that cumulatively continue to pull them down, leading to immobility. While
scholars have long been interested in the mechanisms that lead to this
frustrating labyrinth, the role of state and local law has largely been ignored,
and in doing so, dead ends continue to surface for the poor. Legal
immobility theory seeks to bring to light the question of why there might be
so many dead ends and also to begin to open up the conversation about what
we might do to broaden the pathways to upward mobility.

